[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ays/ispwps/paper2018.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Country Performance during the Covid-19 Pandemic: Externalities, Coordination and the Role of Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Santiago Lago-Peñas

    (Governance and Economics Research Network (GEN), University of Vigo, Spain)

  • Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

    (International Center for Public Policy, Georgia State University, USA)

  • Agnese Sacchi

    (Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy)

Abstract
The Covid-19 pandemic is one of the most powerful examples of negative externalities across the globe. We focus on the role played by institutions at the country level in fighting the spread of Covid-19 by making policy coordination more difficult or, on the contrary, more effective. Specifically, we consider the type of political regimes, political fragmentation and decentralization settings. We use the most recently available information on Covid-19 performance for up to 115 countries around the world. Our main results show that having either democracies or autocracies does not represent a crucial issue for successfully addressing the pandemic. Most significantly, countries with centralized political parties, which fundamentally allow for better coordination at the national level, perform significantly better than those with decentralized ones. However, the assignment of policy responsibilities to sub-national governments is an impediment in fighting the Covid-19 emergency.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Agnese Sacchi, 2020. "Country Performance during the Covid-19 Pandemic: Externalities, Coordination and the Role of Institutions," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2018, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2018
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2020/11/paper2018.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrés Rodríguez‐Pose & Chiara Burlina, 2021. "Institutions and the uneven geography of the first wave of the COVID‐19 pandemic," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 728-752, September.
    2. Schellekens,Philip & Sourrouille,Diego M., 2020. "COVID-19 Mortality in Rich and Poor Countries : A Tale of Two Pandemics ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9260, The World Bank.
    3. Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2005. "Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 395-416, March.
    4. Uchimura, Hiroko & Jütting, Johannes P., 2009. "Fiscal Decentralization, Chinese Style: Good for Health Outcomes?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 1926-1934, December.
    5. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 47-100.
    7. de Haan, Jakob & Siermann, Clemens L J, 1996. "New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy and Economic Growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(1-2), pages 175-198, January.
    8. Terrence Iverson & Edward Barbier, 2021. "National and Sub-National Social Distancing Responses to COVID-19," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-15, May.
    9. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Agnese Sacchi, 2017. "The Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1095-1129, September.
    10. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    11. Shima Hamidi & Sadegh Sabouri & Reid Ewing, 2020. "Does Density Aggravate the COVID-19 Pandemic?," Journal of the American Planning Association, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 86(4), pages 495-509, October.
    12. Anila Channa & Jean-Paul Faguet, 2016. "Decentralization of Health and Education in Developing Countries: A Quality-Adjusted Review of the Empirical Literature," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 31(2), pages 199-241.
    13. Ceyhun Elgin & Oguz Oztunali, 2012. "Shadow Economies around the World: Model Based Estimates," Working Papers 2012/05, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    14. Dennis J. Snower, 2020. "The Socio-Economics of Pandemics Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 8314, CESifo.
    15. Ignacio Lago-Peñas & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2011. "Decentralization and the Nationalization of Party Systems," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 29(2), pages 244-263, April.
    16. Ellingsen, Tore, 1998. "Externalities vs internalities: a model of political integration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 251-268, May.
    17. Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez, 2019. "Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18495.
    18. Carozzi, Felipe & Provenzano, Sandro & Roth, Sefi, 2020. "Urban Density and COVID-19," IZA Discussion Papers 13440, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. ,, 2020. "The Socio-Economics of Pandemics Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14872, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Ignacio Lago-Peñas & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2009. "Does the nationalization of party systems affect the composition of public spending?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 85-98, January.
    21. Peter Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 223-247.
    22. Snower, Dennis J., 2020. "The Socio-Economics of Pandemics Policy," IZA Policy Papers 162, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maria Cadaval Sampedro & Ana Herrero Alcalde & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2022. "Extreme events and the resilience of decentralized governance," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 2212, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    2. Debalke, Negash Mulatu, 2023. "Exploring Disparate Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic and its Containment Measures on Food Security within Ethiopia," MPRA Paper 118288, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2023.
    3. Millemaci, Emanuele & Monteforte, Fabio & Temple, Jonathan R. W., 2023. "Have autocrats governed for the long term?," SocArXiv w8khb, Center for Open Science.
    4. Ryota Nakatani & Qianqian Zhang & Isaura Garcia Valdes, 2024. "Health Expenditure Decentralization and Health Outcomes: The Importance of Governance," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 54(1), pages 59-87.
    5. Klaudijo Klaser, 2020. "A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 11(1-2).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2009. "On the Strategic Use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 281-296, April.
    2. Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2020. "The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 605-639, October.
    3. Ryusuke Shinohara, 2021. "Interregional negotiations and strategic delegation under government subsidy schemes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(3), pages 551-582, June.
    4. Jan Krzysztof Solarz & Krzysztof Waliszewski, 2020. "Holistic Framework for COVID-19 Pandemic as Systemic Risk," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 2), pages 340-351.
    5. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers 4188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2002. "Central governance or subsidiarity: A property-rights approach to federalism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1379-1397, September.
    7. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Wang, Han, 2021. "Local institutions and pandemics: City autonomy and the Black Death," CEPR Discussion Papers 16593, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Arsena Gjipali & Valbona Karapici & Nevila Baci, 2023. "How Do the Labour Force Characteristics Encounter COVID-19 Economic Consequences—A Canadian Experience," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-13, September.
    9. Andreas P Kyriacou & Oriol Roca-Sagalés, 2024. "Fiscal Decentralization and Health Care Access and Quality: Evidence from Local Governments around the World," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 54(2), pages 313-338.
    10. Peter Klibanoff & Michel Poitevin, 2022. "A theory of (de)centralization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(3), pages 417-451, June.
    11. Katharina Lima de Miranda & Dennis J. Snower, 2022. "The societal responses to COVID-19: Evidence from the G7 countries," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 119(25), pages 2117155119-, June.
    12. Janos Feidler & Klaas Staal, 2012. "Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 73-93, March.
    13. Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2010. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 763-787, August.
    14. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political bargaining in a federation: Buchanan meets Coase," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 983-999, October.
    15. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2021. "Pandemic Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 20401.
    16. Luelfesmann, Christoph & Kessler, Anke & Myers, Gordon M., 2015. "The architecture of federations: Constitutions, bargaining, and moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 18-29.
    17. Dur, Robert & Staal, Klaas, 2008. "Local public good provision, municipal consolidation, and national transfers," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 160-173, March.
    18. Loeper, Antoine, 2017. "Cross-border externalities and cooperation among representative democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 180-208.
    19. Andrés Rodríguez‐Pose & Chiara Burlina, 2021. "Institutions and the uneven geography of the first wave of the COVID‐19 pandemic," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 728-752, September.
    20. Capasso, Salvatore & Ohnsorge, Franziska & Yu, Shu, 2022. "From Financial Development to Informality: A Causal Link," CEPR Discussion Papers 17565, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Benson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ispgsus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.