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Competition for the access to and use of information in networks

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Abstract
In a network formation framework, where payoffs reflect an agent's ability to access information from direct and indirect contacts, we integrate negative externalities due to connectivity associated with two types of effects: competition for the access to information, and rivalrous use of information. We consider two separate models to capture the first and the second situations, respectively. In the first model, we assume that information is a non-rivalrous good but that there is competition for the access to information, for example because an agent with many contacts must share his time between them and thus has fewer opportunities to pass on information to each particular contact. The main idea is that the probability that each neighbor receives the information decreases with the number of contacts the sender has. In the second model, we assume that there is not competition for the access to information but that the use of information is rivalrous. In this case, it is assumed that when people receive the information before me, the harmful effect is greater than when others receive the information at the same time as myself. Our results concern pairwise stability and efficiency in both models and allow us to compare and contrast the effects of two kinds of competition for information

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp Möhlmeier & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2016. "Competition for the access to and use of information in networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16033, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:16033
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    1. Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & PHILIPP MÖHLMEIER & AGNIESZKA RUSINOWSKA & EMILY TANIMURA, 2016. "A Degree-Distance-Based Connections Model with Negative and Positive Externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(2), pages 168-192, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Currarini, Sergio & Fumagalli, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2017. "Peer effects and local congestion in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 40-58.
    2. Ping Sun & Elena Parilina, 2024. "Networks with nonordered partitioning of players: stability and efficiency with neighborhood-influenced cost topology," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 99(3), pages 271-305, June.
    3. Ping Sun & Elena Parilina, 2021. "Network Formation with Asymmetric Players and Chance Moves," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(8), pages 1-16, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    network formation; connections model; information; negative externalities; pairwise stability; efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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