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The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options. (2012). Sahuguet, Nicolas ; Chaigneau, Pierre.
In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9182.

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  51. CEO Compensation. (2010). Jenter, Dirk ; Frydman, Carola.
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  52. The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options. (). Sahuguet, Nicolas ; Chaigneau, Pierre.
    In: FMG Discussion Papers.
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