Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations
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- Matthias Lang, 2023. "Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(1), pages 104-134, March.
- Matthias Lang, 2021. "Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9458, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
subjective evaluations; stochastic contracts; stochastic compensation; budget-balanced contracts; moral hazard; subjective performance measures; incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HRM-2022-10-10 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2022-10-10 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
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