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Shall we fear a Patent Waiver? Not for Covid-19 Vaccines

Author

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  • Cozzi, Guido
Abstract
Shall vaccine patents be temporarily suspended? In a simple model, I reflect the essence of the debate on the Covid-19 patent waiver. The central message is that if the probability of imitating innovative vaccines is low, then a patent waiver would be harmless to future R&D. Conversely, a patent waiver would be undesirable if it is too easy to imitate future innovations. This paper also derives a simple policy rule for R&D subsidies that governments can use to correct the adverse effects of the waiver on the incentives to innovate. The vaccine industry is highly concentrated. While the social gains from successful imitation are huge, it is hard to transfer vaccine know-how from the handful of patent holders to potential imitators. In this environment, loosening intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in a pandemic has significant macroeconomic advantages. Still, it may harm future innovation because it would create an expectation of future IPRs waivers. This paper allows an upbeat assessment of the conditions that make a patent waiver desirable, even considering the future R&D implications. Moreover, it shows how reasonably minimal rises of R&D subsidies can overcome the IPRs uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Cozzi, Guido, 2022. "Shall we fear a Patent Waiver? Not for Covid-19 Vaccines," MPRA Paper 111990, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:111990
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/111990/1/MPRA_paper_111990.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Cozzi, Guido & Galli, Silvia, 2022. "Covid-19 Vaccines, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Rights," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1095, Global Labor Organization (GLO).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Covid-19; Research and Development; Vaccines; Intellectual; Health Economics; Property Rights.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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