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On the Optimal Production Capacity for Influenza Vaccine

Author

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  • Forslid, Rikard
  • Herzing, Mathias
Abstract
This paper analyses the profit maximising capacity choice of a monopolistic vaccine producer facing the uncertain event of a pandemic in a homogenous population of forward-looking individuals. For any capacity level the monopolist solves the intertemporal price discrimination problem within the dynamic setting generated by the standard mathematical epidemiological model of infectious diseases. The monopolist thus bases its investment decision on the expected profits from the optimal price path given the infection dynamics. It is shown that the monopolist will always choose to invest in a lower production capacity than the social planner. Through numerical simulation it is demonstrated how the loss to society of having a monopoly producer decreases with the speed of infection transmission. Moreover, it is illustrated how the relationship between the monopolist's optimal vaccination rate and its time discount rate crucially depends on the cost of production capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Forslid, Rikard & Herzing, Mathias, 2008. "On the Optimal Production Capacity for Influenza Vaccine," CEPR Discussion Papers 6808, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6808
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Klumpp & Dominic Loske & Silvio Bicciato, 2022. "COVID-19 health policy evaluation: integrating health and economic perspectives with a data envelopment analysis approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 23(8), pages 1263-1285, November.
    2. David E. Bloom & Michael Kuhn & Klaus Prettner, 2022. "Modern Infectious Diseases: Macroeconomic Impacts and Policy Responses," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 85-131, March.
    3. Nicolas Houy, 2013. "Are better vaccines really better? The case of a simple stochastic epidemic SIR model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 207-216.
    4. Cozzi, Guido, 2022. "Shall we fear a Patent Waiver? Not for Covid-19 Vaccines," MPRA Paper 111990, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Sabine Liebenehm & Bernard Bett & Cristobal Verdugo & Mohamed Said, 2016. "Optimal Drug Control under Risk of Drug Resistance – The Case of African Animal Trypanosomosis," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 510-533, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vaccines;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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