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The Consequences of Using One Assessment System To Pursue Two Objectives

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  • Derek Neal
Abstract
Education officials often use one assessment system both to create measures of student achievement and to create performance metrics for educators. However, modern standardized testing systems are not designed to produce performance metrics for teachers or principals. They are designed to produce reliable measures of individual student achievement in a low-stakes testing environment. The design features that promote reliable measurement provide opportunities for teachers to profitably coach students on test taking skills, and educators typically exploit these opportunities whenever modern assessments are used in high-stakes settings as vehicles for gathering information about their performance. Because these coaching responses often contaminate measures of both student achievement and educator performance, it is likely possible to acquire more accurate measures of both student achievement and education performance by developing separate assessment systems that are designed specifically for each measurement task.

Suggested Citation

  • Derek Neal, 2013. "The Consequences of Using One Assessment System To Pursue Two Objectives," NBER Working Papers 19214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Barrera-Osorio, Felipe & Cilliers, Jacobus & Cloutier, Marie-Hélène & Filmer, Deon, 2022. "Heterogenous teacher effects of two incentive schemes: Evidence from a low-income country," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    3. Gonzalez, Felipe & Prem, Mounu, 2020. "Police Repression and Protest Behavior: Evidence from Student Protests in Chile," SocArXiv 3xk5r, Center for Open Science.
    4. Isaac Mbiti & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper, 2023. "Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(653), pages 1968-2000.
    5. Thomas S. Dee & Will Dobbie & Brian A. Jacob & Jonah Rockoff, 2019. "The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 382-423, July.
    6. Joshua D. Angrist & Erich Battistin & Daniela Vuri, 2014. "In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Mezzogiorno," FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers 2014-04, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation.
    7. Erich Battistin, 2016. "How manipulating test scores affects school accountability and student achievement," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 295-295, September.
    8. Cuesta, José Ignacio & González, Felipe & Larroulet Philippi, Cristian, 2020. "Distorted quality signals in school markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    9. Derek Neal & Joseph Root, 2024. "The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Melanie Lührmann & Marta Serra-Garcia & Joachim Winter, 2018. "The Impact of Financial Education on Adolescents' Intertemporal Choices," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 309-332, August.
    11. Singh, Abhijeet, 2015. "Private school effects in urban and rural India: Panel estimates at primary and secondary school ages," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 16-32.
    12. Cornelisz, Ilja & Meeter, Martijn & van Klaveren, Chris, 2019. "Educational equity and teacher discretion effects in high stake exams," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    13. Berkhout, Emilie & Pradhan, Menno & Rahmawati, & Suryadarma, Daniel & Swarnata, Arya, 2024. "Using technology to prevent fraud in high stakes national school examinations: Evidence from Indonesia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    14. Al-Samarrai, Samer & Shrestha, Unika & Hasan, Amer & Nakajima, Nozomi & Santoso, Santoso & Wijoyo, Wisnu Harto Adi, 2018. "Introducing a performance-based component into Jakarta's school grants: What do we know about its impact after three years?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 110-136.
    15. Ulrik Hvidman & Hans Henrik Sievertsen, 2021. "High-Stakes Grades and Student Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(3), pages 821-849.
    16. Joshua D. Angrist & Erich Battistin & Daniela Vuri, 2014. "In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Mezzogiorno," NBER Working Papers 20173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Joshua D. Angrist & Erich Battistin & Daniela Vuri, 2017. "In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Italian Mezzogiorno," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 216-249, October.
    18. Evans, David K. & Mendez Acosta, Amina, 2023. "How to measure student absenteeism in low- and middle-income countries," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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