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The Social Construction of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Ivan Soraperra
  • Joël van der Weele
  • Marie Claire Villeval

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Shaul Shalvi
Abstract
We experimentally study the social transmission of "inconvenient" information about the externalities generated by one's own decision. In the laboratory, we pair uninformed decision makers with informed senders. Compared to a setting where subjects can choose their information directly, we find that social interactions increase selfish decisions. On the supply side, senders suppress almost 30 percent of "inconvenient" information, driven by their own preferences for information and their beliefs about the decision maker's preferences. On the demand side, about one-third of decision makers avoids senders who transmit inconvenient information ("shooting the messenger"), which leads to assortative matching between information-suppressing senders and information-avoiding decision makers. Having more control over information generates opposing effects on behavior: selfish decision makers remain ignorant more often and donate less, while altruistic decision makers seek out informative senders and give more. We discuss applications to information sharing in social networks and to organizational design.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Soraperra & Joël van der Weele & Marie Claire Villeval & Shaul Shalvi, 2022. "The Social Construction of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-03725590, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03725590
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://cnrs.hal.science/hal-03725590
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Claire Rimbaud & Alice Soldà, 2024. "Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(3), pages 491-547, July.
    3. He, Simin & Pan, Xintong, 2024. "Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    4. Jantsje M. Mol & Ivan Soraperra & Joël J. van der Weele, 2023. "Spoiling the party. Experimental evidence on the willingness to transmit inconvenient ethical information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-062/I, Tinbergen Institute, revised 29 Nov 2024.
    5. Eugen Dimant & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2024. "Motivated information acquisition and social norm formation," Post-Print hal-04740082, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social interactions; information avoidance; assortative matching; ethical behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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