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Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?

Author

Listed:
  • Fortin, B.
  • Lanoie, P.
  • Laporte, C.
Abstract
This paper examines how the Workers'Compensation (WC) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs interact to influence the duration of claims due to workplace accidents.

Suggested Citation

  • Fortin, B. & Lanoie, P. & Laporte, C., 1996. "Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?," Papers 9601, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:lavape:9601
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-244, May.
    2. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie & Christine Laporte, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Workplace Accidents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 17-24, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    2. Paul Lanoie & Sophie Tavenas, 1995. "Costs and Benefits of Preventing Workplace Accidents: The Case of Participatory Ergonomics," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-38, CIRANO.
    3. Fortin, Bernard & Lanoie, Paul, 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9816, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    4. Pierre André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series 738, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE; MORAL HAZARD; CONSTRUCTION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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