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Moral Hazard and Disability Insurance: On the Incidence of Hard-to-Diagnose Medical Conditions in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Disability Program

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  • Michele Campolieti
Abstract
This paper examines the prevalence of hard-to-diagnose conditions, such as musculoskeletal disorders, in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) disability program. Specifically, it uses aggregate data to study the effect of disability benefits and an increase in the rigour of the medical screening on the composition of the medical conditions on the C/QPP's disability rolls. The empirical findings from this paper suggest that the increased generosity of disability benefits has contributed to the increase in the incidence of musculoskeletal conditions on the disability rolls. Furthermore, the increased rigour of the medical screening has induced a reduction in the incidence of musculoskeletal conditions on the disability rolls in recent years.

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  • Michele Campolieti, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Disability Insurance: On the Incidence of Hard-to-Diagnose Medical Conditions in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Disability Program," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 28(3), pages 419-441, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:28:y:2002:i:3:p:419-441
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    Cited by:

    1. Mathilde Godard, 2017. "Targeting disability insurance applications with screening," Post-Print halshs-01660800, HAL.
    2. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," CESifo Working Paper Series 2305, CESifo.
    3. Michele Campolieti & Morley Gunderson & Jeffrey Smith, 2014. "The effect of vocational rehabilitation on the employment outcomes of disability insurance beneficiaries: new evidence from Canada," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-29, December.
    4. Mathilde Godard & Pierre Koning & Maarten Lindeboom, 2024. "Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 59(5), pages 1353-1386.
    5. Liebert, Helge, 2019. "Does external medical review reduce disability insurance inflow?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 108-128.
    6. Laurence Jacquet, 2014. "Tagging and redistributive taxation with imperfect disability monitoring," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 403-435, February.
    7. Kevin Milligan & Tammy Schirle, 2019. "Push and Pull: Disability Insurance, Regional Labor Markets, and Benefit Generosity in Canada and the United States," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(S2), pages 289-323.
    8. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yoram Margalioth, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," Working Papers 0806, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    9. Lindsay Jacobs, 2016. "Occupational Choice, Retirement, and the Effects of Disability Insurance," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-051, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Marijana Badun, 2017. "Determinants of disability pensions in Croatia: the role of institutions," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 41(1), pages 109-128.
    11. Bíró, Anikó & Elek, Péter, 2020. "Job loss, disability insurance and health expenditure," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    12. Michael Baker & Kevin Milligan, 2012. "Disability Insurance Programs in Canada," NBER Chapters, in: Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Historical Trends in Mortality and Health, Employment, and Disability Insurance Participatio, pages 327-358, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Blumkin, Tomer & Margalioth, Yoram & Sadka, Efraim, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275714, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    14. Laurence Jacquet, 2010. "Take it or Leave it: Take-up, Optimal Transfer Programs, and Monitoring," CESifo Working Paper Series 3018, CESifo.
    15. Laurence JACQUET, 2009. "Take it or Leave it : Optimal Transfer Programs, Monitoring and Takeup," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2009003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    16. Liebert, H.;, 2018. "External Medical Review in the Disability Determination Process," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 18/21, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.

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