Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes
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- Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2005. "Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs.A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes," Working Papers 2005.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Regional and sub-global climate blocs. A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes," Working Papers 2006_10, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Richard S.J. Tol & Katrin Rehdanz, 2008. "A no cap but trade proposal for emission targets," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 293-304, May.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 2006.
"Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion,"
Coalition Theory Network Working Papers
12170, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2009. "Cooperation, stability, and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability And Self- Enforcement In International Environmental Agreements : A Conceptual Discussion," Microeconomics Working Papers 22565, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Working Papers 2006.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 2006.
"Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion,"
Coalition Theory Network Working Papers
12170, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Parkash CHANDER & Henry TULKENS, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0609, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2009. "Cooperation, stability, and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability And Self- Enforcement In International Environmental Agreements : A Conceptual Discussion," Microeconomics Working Papers 22565, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion," CORE Discussion Papers 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Working Papers 2006.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Brian Chi-ang Lin & Siqi Zheng & Marco Rogna, 2016. "Cooperative Game Theory Applied To Ieas: A Comparison Of Solution Concepts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 649-678, July.
- Katrin Rehdanz & Richard S.J. Tol, 2005. "A No Cap But Trade Proposal For Greenhous Gas Emission Reduction Targets For Brazil, China And India," Working Papers FNU-68, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Jul 2005.
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More about this item
Keywords
Agreements; climate; Incentives; Negotiations; Policy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENE-2005-06-14 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2005-06-14 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-06-14 (Game Theory)
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