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Communicational Bias In Monetary Policy: Can Words Forecast Deeds?

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Pincheira
  • Mauricio Calani
Abstract
Communication with the public is an ever-growing practice among central banks and complements their decisions of interest rate setting. In this paper we examine one feature of the communicational practice of the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) which summarizes the assessment of the Board about the most likely future of the monetary policy interest rate. We show that this assessment, known as communicational bias or simply c-bias, contains valuable information regarding the future stance of monetary policy. We do this by comparing, against several benchmarks, the c-bias’s ability to correctly forecast the direction of monetary policy rates. Our results indicate that the CBC has (in our sample period) matched words and deeds. The c-bias is a more accurate predictor of the future direction of monetary policy rates than a random walk and a uniformly-distributed random variable. It also improves the predictive ability of a discrete Taylor-Rule-type model that uses persistence, output gap and inflation-deviation-from-target as arguments. We also show that the c-bias can provide information to improve monetary policy rate forecasts based on the forward rate curve.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Pincheira & Mauricio Calani, 2009. "Communicational Bias In Monetary Policy: Can Words Forecast Deeds?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 526, Central Bank of Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:526
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    File URL: https://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/133326/DTBC_526.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. González, Mario & Tadle, Raul Cruz, 2020. "Signaling and financial market impact of chile’s central bank communication: a content analysis approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123054, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Lin, Jianhao & Mei, Ziwei & Chen, Liangyuan & Zhu, Chuanqi, 2023. "Is the People's Bank of China consistent in words and deeds?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. Mario González & Raúl Tadle, 2018. "Monetary Policy Effects on the Chilean Stock Market: An Automated Content Approach," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 817, Central Bank of Chile.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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