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Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good

Author

Listed:
  • Kenju Kamei
  • Louis Putterman
  • Jean-Robert Tyran
Abstract
Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a ìleverage effectî because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2019. "Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good," Working Papers 2019-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2019-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benno Torgler, 2002. "Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 657-683, December.
    2. Jean-Robert Tyran & Alexander K. Wagner, 2016. "Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting," Discussion Papers 16-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    3. Ticchi, Davide & Verdier, Thierry & Vindigni, Andrea, 2013. "Democracy, Dictatorship and the Cultural Transmission of Political Values," POLIS Working Papers 171, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    4. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin G. Kocher, 2010. "Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1540-1566.
    5. Jean‐Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 135-156, March.
    6. Boyu Zhang & Cong Li & Hannelore Silva & Peter Bednarik & Karl Sigmund, 2014. "The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 285-303, June.
    7. repec:bla:jecsur:v:16:y:2002:i:5:p:657-83 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang & Feng Zhu, 2011. "Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1601-1615, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Albanese & Emma Galli & Ilde Rizzo & Carla Scaglioni, 2019. "Building the Glass House: Transparency and Civic Capital across Italian municipalities," Working papers 84, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

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