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Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State

Author

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  • Tyran, Jean-Robert
  • Kamei, Kenju
  • Putterman, Louis
Abstract
Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a “leverage effect†because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Tyran, Jean-Robert & Kamei, Kenju & Putterman, Louis, 2019. "Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State," CEPR Discussion Papers 13985, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13985
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Albanese & Emma Galli & Ilde Rizzo & Carla Scaglioni, 2021. "Transparency, civic capital and political accountability: A virtuous relation?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(2), pages 155-169, May.
    2. Giuseppe Albanese & Emma Galli & Ilde Rizzo & Carla Scaglioni, 2019. "Building the Glass House: Transparency and Civic Capital across Italian municipalities," Working papers 84, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Civic engagement; Public goods provision; Experiment; Cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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