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Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves and Swingers

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  • Michael Bordo, Klodiana Istrefi
Abstract
Narrative records in US newspapers reveal that about 70 percent of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members who served during the last 55 years are perceived to have had persistent policy preferences over time, as either inflation-fighting hawks or growth-promoting doves. The rest are perceived as swingers, switching between types, or remained an unknown quantity to markets. What makes a member a hawk or a dove? What moulds those who change their tune? We highlight ideology by education and early life economic experiences of members of the FOMC from 1960s to 2015. This research is based on an original dataset.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Bordo, Klodiana Istrefi, 2018. "Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves and Swingers," Working papers 683, Banque de France.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:683
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy Committees; Federal Reserve; Policy Preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E03 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Macroeconomics
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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