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Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power

Author

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  • Stefan Voigt

    (University of Kassel)

Abstract
Judicial Independence is a crucial aspect of the rule of law and the concept of separation of powers. It gives judges considerable leeway in interpreting and thereby modifying the constitution. In this paper, the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as an actor in the strategic game played between the other actors on the European level as well as actors on the nation-state level (the respective governments, but also national courts, corporate actors and individuals) is inquired into. After describing the changes of the ECJs competence that have occurred since 1953, an attempt at explaining them is undertaken. It is shown that the ECJ has been able to bring about implicit constitutional change because its members are constrained less stringently than most supreme court judges on the nationstate level. It is furthermore shown that lower court judges have incentives to cooperate with the ECJ sometimes to the detriment of national supreme court judges.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Voigt, "undated". "Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1066, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    • Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2003-1-1066
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    File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=gwp
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alter, Karen J., 2000. "The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 489-518, July.
    2. Mattli, Walter & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 1998. "Revisiting the European Court of Justice," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 177-209, January.
    3. Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 197-224, May.
    4. Andrew Moravcsik, 1995. "Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 611-628, December.
    5. Eli M. Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "On the Delegation of Powers – With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe," Chapters, in: Ram Mudambi & Pietro Maria Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio (ed.), Economic Welfare, International Business and Global Institutional Change, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Cooter, Robert D. & Ginsburg, Tom, 1996. "Comparative judicial discretion: An empirical test of economic models," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 295-313, September.
    7. Stefan Voigt & Hans-Jürgen Wagener (ed.), 2002. "Constitutions, Markets and Law," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2508.
    8. Cooter, Robert & Drexl, Josef, 1994. "The logic of power in the emerging European constitution: Game theory and the division of powers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 307-326, September.
    9. Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, 2002. "Choosing Not To Choose: When Politicians Choose To Delegate Powers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 289-310, May.
    10. Burley, Anne-Marie & Mattli, Walter, 1993. "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 41-76, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Mankowski, "undated". "Kommentar zu Georg von Wangenheim: Wie kommt es zu umfangreichem Sozialschutz im Zivilrecht?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1096, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    2. Knoll Bodo & Koenig Andreas, 2011. "Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 127-145, August.
    3. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2007. "How the court made a federation of the EU," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, March.
    4. Lars Feld, 2005. "The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 417-448, March.
    5. Roland Vaubel, 2009. "Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 203-222, December.
    6. Jean Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2006. "The political economy of European federalism," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 200607, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Court of Justice; Economic Analysis of Court Behavior; Implicit and Explicit Constitutional Change; Preliminary Reference Procedure; Positive Constitutional Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law

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