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Narrative persuasion

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  • Barron, Kai
  • Fries, Tilman
Abstract
We study how one person may shape the way another person interprets objective information. They do this by proposing a sense-making explanation (or narrative). Using a theory-driven experiment, we investigate the mechanics of such narrative persuasion. Our results reveal several insights. First, narratives are persuasive: We find that they systematically shift beliefs. Second, narrative fit (coherence with the facts) is a key determinant of persuasiveness. Third, this fit-heuristic is anticipated by narrative-senders, who systematically tailor their narratives to the facts. Fourth, the features of a competing narrative predictably influence both narrative construction and adoption.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Barron, Kai & Fries, Tilman, 2023. "Narrative persuasion," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2023-301, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2023301
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Graeber & Christopher Roth & Constantin Schesch, 2024. "Explanations," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 291, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    2. Matthes, Julian & Momsen, Katharina, 2024. "Preferences and Demand for Mental Models," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302412, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Narratives; beliefs; financial advice; conflicts of interest; behavioral finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G40 - Financial Economics - - Behavioral Finance - - - General
    • G50 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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