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The Fight against Corruption : Taming Tigers and Swatting Flies

Author

Listed:
  • Chuah,Lay Lian
  • Loayza,Norman V.
  • Myers,C. Bernard
Abstract
Corruption robs the public of precious resources, distorts the incentives to engage in productive activities, destroys confidence in public institutions, and spurs political instability. It disproportionately harms the poor and vulnerable. In turn, corruption is the result of perverse incentives, concentration of power, and lack of accountability. Countries are not condemned to suffer from corruption. They can break the vicious cycle with a comprehensive approach that tackles country-specific governance gaps. This approach should include streamlining rules and regulations; building a meritocratic and well-paid civil service; promoting transparency in public employment, procurement, and services; enabling citizen voice and government accountability; and enforcing anti-corruption laws and penalties.

Suggested Citation

  • Chuah,Lay Lian & Loayza,Norman V. & Myers,C. Bernard, 2020. "The Fight against Corruption : Taming Tigers and Swatting Flies," Research and Policy Briefs 145050, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbkrpb:145050
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    File URL: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/294321578642864410/pdf/The-Fight-against-Corruption-Taming-Tigers-and-Swatting-Flies.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Loayza,Norman V. & Pennings,Steven Michael, 2020. "Macroeconomic Policy in the Time of COVID-19 : A Primer for Developing Countries," Research and Policy Briefs 147291, The World Bank.
    2. Palmisano, Flaviana & Sacchi, Agnese, 2024. "Trust in public institutions, inequality, and digital interaction: Empirical evidence from European Union countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Norman V. Loayza & Steven Pennings, 2020. "Macroeconomic Policy in the Time of COVID-19," World Bank Publications - Reports 33540, The World Bank Group.
    4. Muhammad Mussa Khan & Riaz Ahmad, 2020. "Combating Corruption through Institutional Reforms to Strengthen Economy and Governance: Evidence from Pakistan," Global Economics Review, Humanity Only, vol. 5(1), pages 38-49, March.
    5. Stuti Khemani, 2020. "An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in the Time of COVID-19," World Bank Publications - Reports 33715, The World Bank Group.

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