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Systemic Analysis of Trade Liberalisation: Policy Entreprenuership and Behavioural Variables in a Two-Legal Game Framework

Author

Listed:
  • TROFIMOV, Ivan

    (Kolej Yayasan Saad (KYS) Business School, Ayer Keroh, Malaysia)

Abstract
This paper presents a synthetic framework for the analysis of bilateral trade liberalisation process. It extends usual two-level game model (allowing interplay between domestic trade policy and GATT/WTO negotiation), and incorporates policy entrepreneurship processes (leadership, recombination, consensus-building), behavioural variables (intensity of interest in policy issue, attitudes towards gains and losses and cooperation), as well as systemic forces behind protectionist policies. The factors that determine the path, timing and outcome of the trade policy negotiation are tied in a formal model. The results point to the complementarity and mutual dependence of the factors, and the necessity to simultaneously attend to them during negotiation process. We also show that the success of trade liberalisation hinges upon readiness of the policy system for reform and prior exercise of advocacy and consensus building. Un’analisi sistemica della liberalizzazione del commercio: politica imprenditoriale e variabili comportamentali in un modello di giochi a due livelli Questo studio propone un modello sintetico per l’analisi del processo bilaterale di liberalizzazione del commercio. Estende il modello dei giochi a due livelli (consentendo l’interazione tra politiche di commercio interno e negoziazioni GATT/WTO) e incorpora i processi imprenditoriali (leadership, ricombinazione, ricerca del consenso), variabili di comportamento (livello di interesse verso i problemi politici, attitudine verso i guadagni o le perdite e la cooperazione), così come forze sistemiche al di là delle politiche protezioniste. I fattori che determinano il percorso, la tempistica e il risultato delle negoziazioni commerciali sono collegati in un modello formale. I risultati indicano che i fattori sono complementari e dipendenti uno dall’altro e che è necessario prenderli in considerazione simultaneamente durante il processo di negoziazione. Vi sono inoltre evidenze che il successo della liberalizzazione del commercio dipende dalla prontezza del sistema politico ad effettuare riforme, ad esercitare azioni di difesa e di ricerca del consenso.

Suggested Citation

  • TROFIMOV, Ivan, 2017. "Systemic Analysis of Trade Liberalisation: Policy Entreprenuership and Behavioural Variables in a Two-Legal Game Framework," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 70(2), pages 217-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:ecoint:0801
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy Entrepreneurship; Two-Level Games; Trade Policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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