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Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments

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  • Mayer, Frederick W.
Abstract
When nations negotiate, often the toughest bargaining is not between nations but within them. The reason is simple: proposed international agreements, no matter how much in the “national interest,” inevitably have differential effects on factional concerns, threatening to make winners of some and losers of others. Potential losers often have the power to prevent agreements not to their liking, thereby limiting what is possible in international negotiations. This article uses a negotiation analytic framework to analyze the consequences of such limits. It argues that limits need not be a liability for a divided country—under some circumstances they may provide a bargaining advantage—and demonstrates circumstances under which intracountry differences are desirable and undesirable from a national perspective. More specifically, the article shows that the effect of domestic differences on international negotiations depends on the configuration of domestic interests, on the nature of domestic political processes, and on characteristics of the international bargain. It then explores a particular dimension of the domestic process: the ability to link issues which allow factions to make internal side-payments. It demonstrates that internal issue linkage can have profound effects on the external bargain and explores the strategic implications of side-payments for those who would manage domestic differences in international negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Mayer, Frederick W., 1992. "Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 793-818, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:46:y:1992:i:04:p:793-818_03
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    Cited by:

    1. Han Dorussen & Jongryn Mo, 2001. "Ending Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(4), pages 395-426, August.
    2. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(3), pages 267-297, July.
    3. Dane Rowlands, 1997. "International Aspects of the Division of Debt Under Secession: The Case of Quebec and Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 23(1), pages 40-54, March.
    4. Huikuri, Tuuli-Anna, 2024. "Terminating to Renegotiate? Strategic Exit from International Investment Treaties," OSF Preprints ascmh, Center for Open Science.
    5. Thomas Konig & Jonathan Slapin, 2004. "Bringing Parliaments Back in," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 357-394, July.
    6. Paul Poast, 2013. "Issue linkage and international cooperation: An empirical investigation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(3), pages 286-303, July.
    7. Håkon Sælen, 2016. "Side-payments: an effective instrument for building climate clubs?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 909-932, December.
    8. Jongryn Mo, 1994. "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 402-422, September.
    9. Douglas M. Stinnett, 2007. "International Uncertainty, Foreign Policy Flexibility, and Surplus Majority Coalitions in Israel," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(3), pages 470-495, June.
    10. Christopher K. Butler, 2004. "Modeling Compromise at the International Table," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(3), pages 159-177, July.
    11. Lisa L. Martin, 1994. "4. Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 473-493, October.
    12. TROFIMOV, Ivan, 2017. "Systemic Analysis of Trade Liberalisation: Policy Entreprenuership and Behavioural Variables in a Two-Legal Game Framework," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 70(2), pages 217-244.
    13. Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 1996. "Trade Negotiations, Information And Domestic Politics: The Role Of Domestic Groups," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 145-189, July.
    14. Alan Richards & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water," Development and Comp Systems 0412011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Johannes Müller Gómez, 2023. "Show Me the Money: Side‐Payments and the Implementation of International Agreements in Federal Systems," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 11(3), pages 312-326.
    16. Keisuke Iida, 1993. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 403-426, September.
    17. Vivoda Vlado, 2011. "Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(4), pages 1-36, December.

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