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The effects of Clean Water Act enforcement on environmental employment

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  • Raff, Zach
  • Earnhart, Dietrich
Abstract
This study explores the effects of environmental enforcement on the amount of environmental labor employed by facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. The study uses panel data from a unique survey of chemical manufacturing facilities operating between 1999 and 2001. Specifically, the analysis examines the influence of monitoring inspections and enforcement actions, e.g., fines, on the number of employees allocated to environmental management. Empirical results show that environmental enforcement negatively affects the amount of environmental labor allocated by the sampled facilities. Specifically, increases in federal inspections, informal enforcement actions, and monetary fines each lower environmental employment. Extended model results provide evidence that these negative effects stem from the crowding out of facility managers’ intrinsic motivations.

Suggested Citation

  • Raff, Zach & Earnhart, Dietrich, 2019. "The effects of Clean Water Act enforcement on environmental employment," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:57:y:2019:i:c:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2018.12.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Zach Raff & Jason M. Walter, 2020. "Regulatory Avoidance and Spillover: The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Emissions at Coal-Fired Power Plants," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 75(3), pages 387-420, March.
    2. Zach Raff, 2023. "Identifying the regulator’s objective: Does political support matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 277-295, March.
    3. Zach Raff & Andrew Meyer, 2022. "CAFOs and Surface Water Quality: Evidence from Wisconsin," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 104(1), pages 161-189, January.
    4. Zach Raff & Dietrich Earnhart, 2020. "The effect of environmental enforcement on labor: environmental workers and production workers," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 118-133, April.
    5. Tingwei Chen & Zongbin Zhang, 2023. "Can the Low-Carbon Transition Impact the Urban–Rural Income Gap? Empirical Evidence from the Low-Carbon City Pilot Policy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-21, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental employment; Enforcement; Environmental regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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