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Tariff-jumping antidumping duties

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  • Blonigen, Bruce A.
Abstract
Using a newly constructed database, this paper examines the tariff-jumping response of all firm and product combinations subject to U.S. AD investigations from 1980-1990. The results strongly support the hypothesis that tariff-jumping is only a realistic option for multinational firms from industrialized countries. Because many firms subject to U.S. AD investigations and eventual duties do not have these characteristics, tariff-jumping of U.S. AD protection is relatively modest. It may also explain why developing countries have been more concerned about addressing AD protection in the WTO than industrialized countries. While the raw numbers show a high tariff-response rate for Japanese firms, this is due almost solely to the fact that many of these firms have substantial multinational experience, not due to any Japanese-specific response per se. I also find little evidence that certain U.S. Department of Commerce procedures that use information from the domestic petitioners (rather than the foreign firms) to calculate dumping margins has any impact on tariff-jumping responses.
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Suggested Citation

  • Blonigen, Bruce A., 2002. "Tariff-jumping antidumping duties," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 31-49, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:57:y:2002:i:1:p:31-49
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F6 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization

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