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An Economic Model of Voting Behaviour over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787

Author

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  • McGuire, Robert A.
  • Ohsfeldt, Robert L.
Abstract
Despite hundreds of studies of the influence of economic interests on the formation of the U.S. Constitution, no consensus has been reached. Our study of the Constitutional Convention differs from previous ones by offering an explicit theoretical model of delegates' voting behavior and employing multivariate statistical techniques. We extend our earlier work by analyzing new information on constituents' economic interests and ideology. Further our econometric results on individual roll-call votes strongly suggest delegates who owned slaves or represented slaveowning constituents were more likely to oppose issues favoring a national form of government.

Suggested Citation

  • McGuire, Robert A. & Ohsfeldt, Robert L., 1986. "An Economic Model of Voting Behaviour over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 79-111, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:46:y:1986:i:01:p:79-111_04
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Fałkowski & Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2015. "Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 79-105.
    2. Denise L. Anthony & Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, 1994. "Rational Rhetoric in Politics," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(4), pages 489-518, October.
    3. Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart, 2010. "The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-27, March.
    4. Morong, Cyril, 1996. "Socio-economic elements in Public Choice research," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 559-569.
    5. Anton Lowenberg & Ben Yu, 1992. "Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 51-72, December.
    6. Paul D. Carlsen & Jac C. Heckelman, 2016. "State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(3), pages 781-800, January.
    7. Farley Grubb, 2003. "Creating the U.S. Dollar Currency Union, 1748–1811: A Quest for Monetary Stability or a Usurpation of State Sovereignty for Personal Gain?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1778-1798, December.
    8. Cohen, Alon, 2014. "Independent judicial review: A blessing in disguise," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 209-220.
    9. George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
    10. Keith Dougherty, 2006. "To Form a More Perfect Union: A new economic interpretation of the United States Constitution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 501-503, September.
    11. Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, 2000. "Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-233, November.
    12. Clifford F. Thies, 2005. "Money and the Adoption of the U.S. Constitution," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 20(Spring 20), pages 148-165.

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