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Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Alistair Bruce
  • Trevor Buck
  • Brian G. M. Main
Abstract
abstract We argue that the dominance of principal‐agent theory as an approach to investigating executive pay has led to an overly narrow focus which may be unhelpful when considering cross‐country differences and probably also hinders within‐country analysis. The paper discusses the interlinked nature of three available theoretical lenses, namely principal‐agent, executive power, and stewardship/stakeholder theories. It argues that institutional theory can provide a useful overarching framework within which appropriate variants of these approaches can be deployed to better comprehend developments in executive pay. We illustrate our approach with a discussion of executive pay in the UK and in Germany.

Suggested Citation

  • Alistair Bruce & Trevor Buck & Brian G. M. Main, 2005. "Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7), pages 1493-1506, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jomstd:v:42:y:2005:i:7:p:1493-1506
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00553.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2001. "Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents," CEPR Discussion Papers 3112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Dore, Ronald, 2000. "Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199240616.
    3. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse M. & Walker, David I., 2001. "Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1x24r7st, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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