Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios
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DOI: 10.1111/fima.12289
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- Kifle T. Sebhatu & Fatemeh Taheri & Tekeste Berhanu & Miet Maertens & Steven Van Passel & Marijke D'Haese, 2021. "Beyond focus: Exploring variability of service provision of agricultural cooperatives," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(2), pages 207-231, June.
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