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On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators

Author

Listed:
  • Bogomolnaia, Anna

    (Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow and CNRS Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne)

  • Holzman, Ron

    (Department of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology)

  • Moulin, Hervé

    (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow)

Abstract
A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n≥p the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n

Suggested Citation

  • Bogomolnaia, Anna & Holzman, Ron & Moulin, Hervé, 2023. "On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4832
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herv'e Moulin, 2024. "Guaranteed shares of benefits and costs," Papers 2406.14198, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Worst case; guarantees; voting by veto; random dictator;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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