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IEAs and compliance: Do treaty linkages play a role?

Author

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  • Maamoun, Nada
Abstract
International environmental agreements (IEAs) address cross-border public goods, therefore they are faced with free-riding problems. Generally, the incentives of states to comply with such treaties are low as the benefits of compliance do not always outweigh the cost. Previous literature has pointed towards the importance of the treaty design characteristics in motivating compliance and deterring free-riding. The aim of this paper is to investigate the association of using of those mechanisms -treaty linkages- and the compliance with IEAs. By using data on 92 IEAs from the international regime database (IRD), the paper finds that the number of reinforcing links per treaty has a positive and significant association with better compliance. Counter to existing literature, trade links, however, do not exhibit a significant association with better compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Maamoun, Nada, 2021. "IEAs and compliance: Do treaty linkages play a role?," ILE Working Paper Series 43, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:43
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/228514/1/ile-wp-2021-43.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Environmental agreements; Treaty linkages; Compliance; Public goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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