[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/glodps/1340.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice

Author

Listed:
  • Burdin, Gabriel
  • Dughera, Stefano
  • Landini, Fabio
  • Belloc, Filippo
Abstract
Advances in artificial intelligence and data analytics have notably expanded employers' monitoring and surveillance capabilities, facilitating the accurate observability of work effort. There is an ongoing debate among academics and policymakers about the productivity and broader welfare implications of digital monitoring (DM) technologies. In this context, many countries confer information, consultation and codetermination rights to employee representation (ER) bodies on matters related to workplace organization and the introduction of new technologies, which could potentially discourage employers from making DM investments. Using a cross-sectional sample of more than 21000 European establishments, we find instead that establishments with ER are more likely to utilize DM technologies than establishments without ER. We also document a positive effect of ER on DM utilization in the context of a local-randomization regression discontinuity analysis that exploits size-contingent policy rules governing the operation of ER bodies in Europe. We rationalize this unexpected finding through the lens of a theoretical framework in which shared governance via ER create organizational safeguards that mitigate workers' negative responses to monitoring and undermines the disciplining effect of DM technologies.

Suggested Citation

  • Burdin, Gabriel & Dughera, Stefano & Landini, Fabio & Belloc, Filippo, 2023. "Contested Transparency: Digital Monitoring Technologies and Worker Voice," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1340, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:1340
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/278823/1/GLO-DP-1340.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luis Garicano & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, 2016. "Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3439-3479, November.
    2. Filippo Belloc & Gabriel Burdin & Fabio Landini, 2023. "Advanced Technologies and Worker Voice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(357), pages 1-38, January.
    3. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    4. Uwe JIRJAHN & Stephen C. SMITH, 2018. "Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory And The German Experience With Mandated Works Councils," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 201-233, March.
    5. Wolfgang Dauth & Sebastian Findeisen & Jens Suedekum & Nicole Woessner, 2021. "The Adjustment of Labor Markets to Robots [“Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3104-3153.
    6. Giorgio Presidente, 2023. "Institutions, Holdup, and Automation," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 32(4), pages 831-847.
    7. Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 1988. "Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern Economic Theory," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt82d2v3gb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    8. Lynn Wu & Lorin Hitt & Bowen Lou, 2020. "Data Analytics, Innovation, and Firm Productivity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2017-2039, May.
    9. Skott, Peter & Guy, Frederick, 2007. "A model of power-biased technological change," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 124-131, April.
    10. Bowles, Samuel, 1985. "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 16-36, March.
    11. Maximilian Kasy, 2023. "The political economy of AI: Towards democratic control of the means of prediction," Economics Series Working Papers 1014, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    12. repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:201-233 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Thomas N. Hubbard, 2000. "The Demand for Monitoring Technologies: The Case of Trucking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 533-560.
    14. Michèle Belot & Marina Schröder, 2016. "The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(1), pages 37-45, January.
    15. Grund, Christian & Sliwka, Dirk & Titz, Krystina, 2024. "Works councils as gatekeepers: Codetermination, management practices, and job satisfaction," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    16. Michael Beckmann & Matthias Kräkel, 2022. "Empowerment, Task Commitment, and Performance Pay," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(4), pages 889-938.
    17. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    18. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
    19. Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Cattani, Luca & Ellis, William & Landini, Fabio, 2022. "Coevolution of job automation risk and workplace governance," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(3).
    20. Nicholas Bloom & Steven J. Davis & Yulia Zhestkova, 2021. "COVID-19 Shifted Patent Applications toward Technologies That Support Working from Home," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 111, pages 263-266, May.
    21. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2021. "Adverse Effects of Contol: Evidence from a Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 8890, CESifo.
    22. Cardullo, Gabriele & Conti, Maurizio & Sulis, Giovanni, 2015. "Sunk capital, unions and the hold-up problem: Theory and evidence from cross-country sectoral data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 253-274.
    23. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    24. Beckmann, Michael & Kräkel, Matthias, 2012. "Internal rent seeking, works councils, and optimal establishment size," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 711-726.
    25. Zoe Adams & Parisa Bastani & Louise Bishop & Simon Deakin, 2017. "The CBR-LRI Dataset: Methods, Properties & Potential of Leximetric Coding of Labour Laws," Working Papers wp489, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    26. Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 1988. "Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 145-150, May.
    27. John T. Addison & Thorsten Schank & Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner, 2007. "Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(2), pages 187-203, January.
    28. Frey, Bruno S., 1993. "Shirking or work morale? : The impact of regulating," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1523-1532, December.
    29. Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare & Matias Cattaneo & Rocio Titiunik, 2016. "rdlocrand: a Stata Package for Inference in Regression Discontinuity Designs under Local Randomizati," 2016 Stata Conference 25, Stata Users Group.
    30. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, 2006. "Fairness Perceptions and Reservation Wages—the Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wage Laws," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1347-1381.
    31. Jensen, Michael C & Meckling, William H, 1979. "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 469-506, October.
    32. Simon Jäger & Shakked Noy & Benjamin Schoefer, 2022. "The German Model of Industrial Relations: Balancing Flexibility and Collective Action," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 53-80, Fall.
    33. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December.
    34. Lea Cassar & Stephan Meier, 2018. "Nonmonetary Incentives and the Implications of Work as a Source of Meaning," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 215-238, Summer.
    35. Esther Duflo & Rema Hanna & Stephen P. Ryan, 2012. "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1241-1278, June.
    36. Cattaneo Matias D. & Frandsen Brigham R. & Titiunik Rocío, 2015. "Randomization Inference in the Regression Discontinuity Design: An Application to Party Advantages in the U.S. Senate," Journal of Causal Inference, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-24.
    37. Antonio ALOISI & Valerio DE STEFANO, 2022. "Essential jobs, remote work and digital surveillance: Addressing the COVID‐19 pandemic panopticon," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 161(2), pages 289-314, June.
    38. Sinan Aral & Erik Brynjolfsson & Lynn Wu, 2012. "Three-Way Complementarities: Performance Pay, Human Resource Analytics, and Information Technology," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(5), pages 913-931, May.
    39. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    40. Lynn Wu & Bowen Lou & Lorin Hitt, 2019. "Data Analytics Supports Decentralized Innovation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4863-4877, October.
    41. Burdin, Gabriel & Halliday, Simon & Landini, Fabio, 2018. "The hidden benefits of abstaining from control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 1-12.
    42. Lee, David S., 2008. "Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 675-697, February.
    43. Benlian, Alexander & Wiener, Martin & Cram, W. Alec & Krasnova, Hanna & Maedche, Alexander & Möhlmann, Mareike & Recker, Jan & Remus, Ulrich, 2022. "Algorithmic Management: Bright and Dark Sides, Practical Implications, and Research Opportunities," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 133638, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    44. Matias D. Cattaneo & Roc ́ıo Titiunik & Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare, 2016. "Inference in regression discontinuity designs under local randomization," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 16(2), pages 331-367, June.
    45. Tursunbayeva, Aizhan & Di Lauro, Stefano & Pagliari, Claudia, 2018. "People analytics—A scoping review of conceptual boundaries and value propositions," International Journal of Information Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 224-247.
    46. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-480, March.
    47. Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 1993. "A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 75-100, April.
    48. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
    49. Grund, Christian & Sliwka, Dirk & Titz, Krystina, 2023. "Works Councils as Gatekeepers: Codetermination, Monitoring Practices, and Job Satisfaction," IZA Discussion Papers 15956, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    50. Burt S. Barnow & Matias D. Cattaneo & Rocío Titiunik & Gonzalo Vazquez‐Bare, 2017. "Comparing Inference Approaches for RD Designs: A Reexamination of the Effect of Head Start on Child Mortality," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(3), pages 643-681, June.
    51. Lamar Pierce & Daniel C. Snow & Andrew McAfee, 2015. "Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(10), pages 2299-2319, October.
    52. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
    53. Giovanni Sulis & Gabriele Cardullo, 2023. "Unions and investment in intangible capital," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 201-201, May.
    54. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong, 1999. "Carrots or sticks? A social custom viewpoint on worker effort," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 297-310, June.
    55. Frey, Bruno S, 1993. "Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(4), pages 663-670, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Landini, Fabio, 2022. "Robots, Digitalization, and Worker Voice," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1038, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    2. Filippo Belloc & Gabriel Burdin & Fabio Landini, 2023. "Advanced Technologies and Worker Voice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(357), pages 1-38, January.
    3. Brandts, Jordi & Corgnet, Brice & Hernán-González, Roberto & Ortiz, José Mª & Solà, Carles, 2021. "Watching or not watching? Access to information and the incentive effects of firing threats," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 672-685.
    4. Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Landini, Fabio, 2020. "Robots and Worker Voice: An Empirical Exploration," IZA Discussion Papers 13799, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Holger Herz & Christian Zihlmann, 2024. "Adverse effects of control? Evidence from a field experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(2), pages 469-488, April.
    6. De Chiara, Alessandro & Engl, Florian & Herz, Holger & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Control Aversion in Hierarchies," FSES Working Papers 527, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    7. Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Cattani, Luca & Ellis, William & Landini, Fabio, 2022. "Coevolution of job automation risk and workplace governance," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(3).
    8. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650.
    9. Giuseppe Lanza & Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra, 2020. "Can Citizens Affect the Performance of Their Elected Representatives? A Principal–Agent Model of Strategic Interaction in Democratic Systems," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-14, July.
    10. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    11. Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008. "Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-76, May.
    12. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Russo, Giovanni & Van Houten, Gijs, 2021. "Complex Job Design and Layers of Hierarchy," IZA Discussion Papers 14455, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2012. "Rewarding carrots and crippling sticks: Eliciting employee preferences for the optimal incentive design," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1247-1265.
    15. Kathrin Manthei & Dirk Sliwka & Timo Vogelsang, 2023. "Talking About Performance or Paying for It? A Field Experiment on Performance Reviews and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2198-2216, April.
    16. Guendalina Anzolin & Chiara Benassi & Armanda Cetrulo, 2024. "Industrial relations and firm-level innovation. A comparative analysis of establishment data in Germany and Italy," LEM Papers Series 2024/12, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    17. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    18. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    19. Conover, Emily & Kraynak, Daniel & Singh, Prakarsh, 2023. "The effect of traffic cameras on police effort: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    20. Atı̇la Abdulkadı̇roğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2022. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 117-151, January.
    21. Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Digital-based monitoring; algorithmic management; HR analytics; transparency; control aversion; worker voice; employee representation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:1340. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/glabode.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.