4 per cent) in Portugal�s smallest electoral districts (e.g., Beja and Évora). Nevertheless even in Portugal�s largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares."> 4 per cent) in Portugal�s smallest electoral districts (e.g., Beja and Évora). Nevertheless even in Portugal�s largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares.">
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Institutional Incentives for Strategic Voting:

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  • Gschwend, Thomas

    (Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

Abstract
Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible outcome of the election in their electoral district I will provide evidence for the first time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems with large districts magnitudes, such as in Portugal. Employing district-level data from 1975-2002 I estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number does systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district and is largest (> 4 per cent) in Portugal�s smallest electoral districts (e.g., Beja and Évora). Nevertheless even in Portugal�s largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares.

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  • Gschwend, Thomas, 2005. "Institutional Incentives for Strategic Voting:," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    • Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:05-03
    Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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    File URL: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp05-03.pdf
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    1. Cox, Gary W & Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 1996. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 299-324, October.
    2. Gunther, Richard, 1989. "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 835-858, September.
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    1. Gschwend, Thomas, 2008. "Electoral system change in Belgium 2003 : party strategies and voter responses," Papers 08-29, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
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