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Comparative politics of strategic voting : a hierarchy of electoral systems

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  • Gschwend, Thomas
Abstract
What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the voting booth? Traditionally the literature about electoral systems argues that the size of the district magnitude determines the amount of strategic voting. I argue, however, that different electoral systems provide incentives that potentially undermine or facilitate the Duvergerian logic in practice. Contrary to the literature the results indicate that the impact of the district magnitude on the frequency of strategic voting in a given polity is conditional on the type of seat allocation system that defines how votes get translated into parliamentary seats.

Suggested Citation

  • Gschwend, Thomas, 2004. "Comparative politics of strategic voting : a hierarchy of electoral systems," Papers 04-41, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2701
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gschwend, Thomas & Johnston, Ron & Pattie, Charles, 2003. "Split-Ticket Patterns in Mixed-Member Proportional Election Systems: Estimates and Analyses of Their Spatial Variation at the German Federal Election, 1998," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 109-127, January.
    2. Cox, Gary W & Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 1996. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 299-324, October.
    3. Federico Ferrara & Erik S. Herron, 2005. "Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(1), pages 16-31, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. St'ephane Dupraz & Daniel Muller & Lionel Page, 2013. "Tactical Voting and Voter's Sophistication in British Elections," QuBE Working Papers 011, QUT Business School.

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