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The Politics of Bank Failures in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Zuzana FungÃ¡Ä ová
  • Alexei Karas
  • Laura Solanko
  • Laurent Weill
Abstract
We study whether bank failure probability systematically varies over the election cycle in Russia. Using monthly data for 2002-2020 and controlling for standard bank risk indicators we find that bank failure is less likely during periods preceding presidential elections. We explore whether this effect is more pronounced for banks whose failure is associated with greater political costs, such as important players in the household deposit market or important players in regional markets. We find no evidence for this latter effect. Overall, our results provide mixed evidence that political cycles matter for the occurrence of bank failures in Russia.

Suggested Citation

  • Zuzana FungÃ¡Ä ová & Alexei Karas & Laura Solanko & Laurent Weill, 2022. "The Politics of Bank Failures in Russia," Working Papers 2206, Utrecht School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:2206
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fungáčová, Zuzana & Schoors, Koen & Solanko, Laura & Weill, Laurent, 2020. "Political cycles and bank lending in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2020, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    2. Ruben Enikolopov & Maria Petrova & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3253-3285, December.
    3. Berglof, Erik & Lehmann, Alexander, 2009. "Sustaining Russia's growth: The role of financial reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 198-206, June.
    4. Daniel Berkowitz & Mark Hoekstra & Koen Schoors, 2012. "Does Finance Cause Growth? Evidence from the Origins of Banking in Russia," NBER Working Papers 18139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September.
    6. Karsten Müller, 2023. "Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 295-322, November.
    7. Craig O. Brown & I. Serdar Dinç, 2005. "The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1413-1444.
    8. A. Karas & K. Schoors, 2005. "Heracles or Sisyphus? Finding, cleaning and reconstructing a database of Russian banks," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/327, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    9. repec:zbw:bofitp:2020_008 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. William Tompson, 1997. "Old habits die hard: Fiscal imperatives, state regulation and the role of Russia's banks," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(7), pages 1159-1185.
    11. Dinc, I. Serdar, 2005. "Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 453-479, August.
    12. Liu, Wai-Man & Ngo, Phong T.H., 2014. "Elections, political competition and bank failure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 251-268.
    13. repec:hhs:bofitp:2012_010 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Koen Schoors & Laurent Weill, 2020. "Politics and banking in Russia: the rise of Putin," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(5-6), pages 451-474, November.
    15. DeYoung, Robert & Torna, Gökhan, 2013. "Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 397-421.
    16. Daniel Carvalho, 2014. "The Real Effects of Government-Owned Banks: Evidence from an Emerging Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 577-609, April.
    17. Arena, Marco, 2008. "Bank failures and bank fundamentals: A comparative analysis of Latin America and East Asia during the nineties using bank-level data," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 299-310, February.
    18. Berkowitz, Daniel & Hoekstra, Mark & Schoors, Koen, 2014. "Bank privatization, finance, and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 93-106.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fungáčová, Zuzana & Schoors, Koen & Solanko, Laura & Weill, Laurent, 2023. "Staying on top: Political cycles in private bank lending," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 899-917.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank Failure; Election; Russia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance

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