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Admission is free only if your dad is rich! distributional effects of corruption in schools in developing countries

Author

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  • Emran, M. Shahe
  • Islam, Asadul
  • Shilpi, Forhad
Abstract
In the standard model of corruption, the rich are more likely to pay bribes for their children's education, reflecting higher ability to pay. This prediction is, however, driven by the assumption that the probability of punishment for bribe-taking is invariant across households. In many developing countries lacking in rule of law, this assumption is untenable, because the enforcement of law is not impersonal or unbiased and the poor have little bargaining power. In a more realistic model where the probability of punishment depends on the household's economic status, bribes are likely to be regressive, both at the extensive and intensive margins. Using rainfall variations as an instrument for household income in rural Bangladesh, this paper finds strong evidence that corruption in schools is doubly regressive: (i) the poor are more likely to pay bribes, and (ii) among the bribe payers, the poor pay a higher share of their income. The results indicate that progressivity in bribes reported in the earlier literature may be due to identification challenges. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions show that bribes increase with household income, but the Instrumental Variables estimates suggest that the Ordinary Least Squares results are spurious, driven by selection on ability and preference. The evidence reported in this paper implies that"free schooling"is free only for the rich and corruption makes the playing field skewed against the poor. This may provide a partial explanation for the observed educational immobility in developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Emran, M. Shahe & Islam, Asadul & Shilpi, Forhad, 2013. "Admission is free only if your dad is rich! distributional effects of corruption in schools in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6671, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6671
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    Cited by:

    1. Oana Borcan & Mikael Lindahl & Andreea Mitrut, 2017. "Fighting Corruption in Education: What Works and Who Benefits?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 180-209, February.
    2. Emran, M. Shahe & Islam, Asadul & Shilpi, Forhad, 2013. "Admission is free only if your dad is rich! distributional effects of corruption in schools in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6671, The World Bank.
    3. Lisa Sofie Höckel & Manuel Santos Silva & Tobias Stöhr, 2018. "Can Parental Migration Reduce Petty Corruption in Education?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 32(1), pages 109-126.
    4. Maty Konte, 2021. "How do education resources respond to the quality of local governance in Africa?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 1538-1557, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rural Poverty Reduction; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Labor Policies; Inequality; Economic Theory&Research;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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