A Theory of Firm Decline
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- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 861-885, October.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale, 2009. "A Theory of Firm Decline," NBER Working Papers 15192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia B. Di Giannatale, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000149, David K. Levine.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia DiGiannatale, 2009. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Working Papers 09-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Gian Luca, Clementi & Cooley, Thomas & Di Giannatale, Sonia, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Institutions and Markets Papers 92788, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2008. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Working Papers DTE 445, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatal, 2010. "A Theory of Firm Decline," Working Papers 2010.88, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Clementi, Gian Luca & Cooley, Thomas F. & Wang, Cheng, 2006.
"Stock grants as a commitment device,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2191-2216, November.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Cheng Wang, "undated". "Stock Grants as Commitment Device," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Chen Wang, 2004. "Stock Grants as a Committment Device," Working Papers 04-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Clementi, Gian Luca & Cooley, Thomas F. & Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Stock Grants As a Commitment Device," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12300, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Itza T. Q. Curiel-Cabral, 2013. "Compromises and Incentives," Working Papers DTE 559, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Mele, Antonio, 2014.
"Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
- Antonio Mele, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard and Recursive Lagrangeans," 2008 Meeting Papers 482, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mele, Antonio, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," MPRA Paper 30310, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mele, Antonio, 2010. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," MPRA Paper 21741, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Espino, Emilio & Kozlowski, Julian & Sánchez, Juan M., 2018.
"Investment and bilateral insurance,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 311-341.
- Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Juan M. Sanchez, 2013. "Investment and Bilateral Insurance," Working Papers 2013-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Wang, Cheng, 1997.
"Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
- Wang, C., 1995. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," GSIA Working Papers 1995-08, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5170, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Maideu-Morera, Gerard, 2024. "Firm Size and Compensation Dynamics with Risk Aversion and Persistent Private Information," TSE Working Papers 24-1535, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Emilio Espino, 2012. "Investment and Insurance in an Economic Union," 2012 Meeting Papers 1176, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Chang-Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2017.
"The impact of firm size on dynamic incentives and investment,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 147-177, March.
- Chi, Chang Koo & Choi, Kyoung Jin, 2016. "The Impact of Firm Size on Dynamic Incentives and Investment," MPRA Paper 80867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005.
"When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
- Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Loderer, Claudio & Waelchli, Urs, 2010. "Firm age and performance," MPRA Paper 26450, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Juan M. Sanchez, 2013.
"Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships,"
Working Papers
2013-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Julian Kozlowski & Juan Sanchez & Emilio Espino, 2015. "Too Big to Cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships," 2015 Meeting Papers 1308, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jesse Perla & Carolin Pflueger & Michal Szkup, 2020.
"Doubling Down on Debt: Limited Liability as a Financial Friction,"
NBER Working Papers
27747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jesse Perla & Carolin Pflueger & Michal Szkup, 2020. "Doubling Down on Debt: Limited Liability as a Financial Friction," Working Papers 2020-122, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
- Pflueger, Carolin & Perla, Jesse & Szkup, Michal, 2020. "Doubling Down on Debt: Limited Liability as a Financial Friction," CEPR Discussion Papers 15238, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2013. "Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans’s dilemma," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 151-166, January.
- Tsyrennikov, Viktor, 2013. "Capital flows under moral hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 92-108.
- Chong Lai & Rui Li & Yonghong Wu, 2020. "Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 407-422, September.
- Hengjie Ai & Rui Li, 2012. "Moral hazard, investment, and firm dynamics," FRB Atlanta CQER Working Paper 2012-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
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More about this item
Keywords
Principal–Agent; Moral Hazard; Hidden Action; Incentives; Firm Dynamics;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Statistics
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