[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rep/wpaper/2012-05.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Forestry and the New Institutional Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Sen Wang
  • Tim Bogle
  • G. Cornelis van Kooten
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Sen Wang & Tim Bogle & G. Cornelis van Kooten, 2012. "Forestry and the New Institutional Economics," Working Papers 2012-05, University of Victoria, Department of Economics, Resource Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:rep:wpaper:2012-05
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://web.uvic.ca/~repa/publications/REPA%20working%20papers/WorkingPaper2012-05.pdf
    File Function: Final version, 2012
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, 1993. "Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 78-100, Spring.
    3. Joskow, Paul L, 1988. "Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 47-83, April.
    4. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 1," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 3-26, January.
    5. Ronald H. Coase, 2008. "The Institutional Structure of Production," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 2, pages 31-39, Springer.
    6. John A. Gray, 2002. "Forest Concession Policies and Revenue Systems : Country Experience and Policy Changes for Sustainable Tropical Forestry," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14094.
    7. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    8. Alston, Lee J & Datta, Samar K & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 1984. "Tenancy Choice in a Competitive Framework with Transactions Costs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1121-1133, December.
    9. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    10. Goldberg, Victor P & Erickson, John R, 1987. "Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 369-398, October.
    11. Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce S., 2009. "The response to incentives and contractual efficiency: Evidence from a field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 481-494, July.
    12. Stigler, George J., 2011. "Economics of Information," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 35-49.
    13. Globerman, Steven & Schwindt, Richard, 1986. "The organization of vertically related transactions in the Canadian forest products industries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 199-212, June.
    14. Kiker, Clyde F. & Putz, Francis E., 1997. "Ecolocical certification of forest products: Economic challenges," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 37-51, January.
    15. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
    16. Masten, Scott E. (ed.), 1996. "Case Studies in Contracting and Organization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195092523.
    17. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    18. Joskow, Paul L, 1985. "Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-80, Spring.
    19. Mulherin, J Harold, 1986. "Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 105-117, Spring.
    20. Levy, David T, 1985. "The Transactions Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: An Empirical Examination," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 67(3), pages 438-445, August.
    21. Krepps, Matthew B. & Caves, Richard E., 1994. "Bureaucrats and Indians: Principal-agent relations and efficient management of tribal forest resources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 133-151, July.
    22. Bardhan, Pranab, 1989. "The new institutional economics and development theory: A brief critical assessment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1389-1395, September.
    23. Lieberman, Marvin B, 1991. "Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical Test," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 451-466, September.
    24. Masten, Scott E & Meehan, James W, Jr & Snyder, Edward A, 1991. "The Costs of Organization," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
    25. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    26. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    27. Gary J. Miller, 2005. "Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms," Springer Books, in: Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 14, pages 349-370, Springer.
    28. G. Cornelis van Kooten, 2008. "Biological Carbon Sinks: Transaction Costs and Governance," Working Papers 2008-12, University of Victoria, Department of Economics, Resource Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group.
    29. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    30. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-361, October.
    31. Joesph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 552-579, Autumn.
    32. Acheson, James M, 1985. "The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 385-398, Fall.
    33. R. H. Coase, 1972. "Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect, Volume 3, Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization, pages 59-73, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    34. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    35. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-185, March.
    36. Leffler, Keith B & Rucker, Randal R, 1991. "Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1060-1087, October.
    37. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "`Long-term contracting, sticky prices, and monetary policy' : A comment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 317-323, July.
    38. Niquidet, Kurt, 2008. "Revitalized? An event study of forest policy reform in British Columbia," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 227-241, November.
    39. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 2," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 75-95, May.
    40. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    41. Vedel, Suzanne E. & Lund, Dorthe H. & Jacobsen, Jette B. & Helles, Finn, 2006. "Grants for advisory services in the private Danish forestry sector - A principal-agent approach," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 185-199, December.
    42. Paul L. Joskow, 1990. "The Performance of Long-Term Contracts: Further Evidence from Coal Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(2), pages 251-274, Summer.
    43. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    44. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    45. van Ackere, Ann, 1993. "The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 83-103, October.
    46. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    47. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    48. Rucker, Randal R & Leffler, Keith B, 1988. "To Harvest or Not to Harvest? An Analysis of Cutting Behavior on Federal Timber Sales Contracts," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(2), pages 207-213, May.
    49. Rametsteiner, Ewald, 2002. "The role of governments in forest certification--a normative analysis based on new institutional economics theories," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 163-173, July.
    50. Gregory S. Amacher & Richard J. Brazee & Meindert Witvliet, 2001. "Royalty Systems, Government Revenues, and Forest Condition: An Application from Malaysia," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(2), pages 300-313.
    51. Furubotn, Eirik G & Pejovich, Svetozar, 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1137-1162, December.
    52. G. Cornelis van Kooten & Sabina Lee Shaikh & Pavel Suchánek, 2002. "Mitigating Climate Change by Planting Trees: The Transaction Costs Trap," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(4), pages 559-572.
    53. David L. Haley, 1985. "The Forest Tenure System as a Constraint on Efficient Timber Management: Problems and Solutions," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 11(s1), pages 315-320, July.
    54. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
    55. Ronald H. Coase, 2000. "The new institutional economics," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    56. Bogle, Tim & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 2013. "Options for maintaining forest productivity after natural disturbance: A principal–agent approach," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 138-144.
    57. Zhang, Y., 2001. "Economics of transaction costs saving forestry," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-204, February.
    58. Klein, Benjamin, 1988. "Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 199-213, Spring.
    59. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, September.
    60. Herbert A. Simon, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
    61. MacDonald, James M, 1985. "Market Exchange or Vertical Integration: An Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 67(2), pages 327-331, May.
    62. Hubbard, R Glenn & Weiner, Robert J, 1991. "Efficient Contracting and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 25-67, April.
    63. Luckert, M.K. (Marty), 2007. "Property rights, forest rents, and trade: The case of US countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(6), pages 581-590, February.
    64. Hallwood, C Paul, 1991. "On Choosing Organizational-Arrangements: The Example of Offshore Oil Gathering," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 38(3), pages 227-241, August.
    65. Alfred D. Chandler, 1992. "Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 79-100, Summer.
    66. Francois Hennart, Jean, 1988. "Upstream vertical integration in the aluminum and tin industries : A comparative study of the choice between market and intrafirm coordination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 281-299, April.
    67. Langlois, Richard N. & Robertson, Paul L., 1989. "Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 361-375, June.
    68. Masten, Scott E, 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 403-417, October.
    69. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn.
    70. Bowers, John, 2005. "Instrument choice for sustainable development: an application to the forestry sector," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 97-107, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Biggs & Susanna Laaksonen-Craig & Kurt Niquidet & G. Cornelis van Kooten, 2006. "Resolving Canada-US Trade Disputes in Agriculture and Forestry: Lessons from Lumber," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 32(2), pages 143-156, June.
    2. Maria Nijnik & Arie Oskam & A. Nijnik, 2005. "Contribution Of Afforestation To Sustainable Land Management In Ukraine," ERSA conference papers ersa05p746, European Regional Science Association.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    2. repec:bla:jomstd:v:47:y:2010:i:s1:p:859-883 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Fan, Joseph P. H., 2000. "Price uncertainty and vertical integration: an examination of petrochemical firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 345-376, December.
    4. Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Market Structure [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    5. López-Bayón, Susana & González-Díaz, Manuel, 2010. "Indefinite contract duration: Evidence from electronics subcontracting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 145-159, June.
    6. Costello, Anna M., 2013. "Mitigating incentive conflicts in inter-firm relationships: Evidence from long-term supply contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 19-39.
    7. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory : A Survey of Some Recent Work," Working Papers 2002-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    8. M'Hand Farès & Stéphane Saussier, 2002. "Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 193-230.
    9. Jérôme Barthélemy & Bertrand Quélin, 2002. "Competence, Specificity and Outsourcing : Impact on the complexity of the contract," Working Papers hal-00593655, HAL.
    10. Bigelow, Lyda S. & Argyres, Nicholas, 2008. "Transaction costs, industry experience and make-or-buy decisions in the population of early U.S. auto firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 791-807, June.
    11. Lajili, Kaouthar & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2005. "Revisiting Agency and Transaction Costs Theory Predictions on Vertical Financial Ownership and Contracting: Electronic Integration as an Organizational Form Choice," Working Papers 05-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    12. Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 2000. "Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 167-187, June.
    13. Maloney, Michael T., 2017. "Alchian remembrances," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 561-582.
    14. Stéphane Saussier, 1998. "La durée des contrats interentreprises : une analyse empirique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 135(4), pages 137-146.
    15. Nicholas S. Argyres & Janet Bercovitz & Kyle J. Mayer, 2007. "Complementarity and Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(1), pages 3-19, February.
    16. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
    17. Davide Vannoni, 1999. "Empirical Studies of Vertical Integration: the Transaction Cost Orthodoxy," CERIS Working Paper 199903, CNR-IRCrES Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Torino (TO) ITALY - former Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY.
    18. Altman, Ira J. & Johnson, Thomas G., 2004. "A Transaction Cost Econoimcs View Of Agriculture Exchanges For Biopower: Theoretical And Methodological Concerns," 2004 Annual Meeting, February 14-18, 2004, Tulsa, Oklahoma 34686, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    19. Brodrechtova, Yvonne, 2015. "Economic valuation of long-term timber contracts: Empirical evidence from Germany," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 1-9.
    20. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    21. Manuel González & Benito Arruñada & Alberto Fernández, 1997. "La decisión de subcontratar: el caso de las empresas constructoras," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 21(3), pages 501-521, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    transaction costs; prinicpal-agent theory; forest tenures; governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rep:wpaper:2012-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: G.C. van Kooten (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/devicca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.