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North Korea: Sanctions, Engagement, and Strategic Reorientation

Author

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  • Noland, Marcus
Abstract
This paper examines the roles that sanctions, and inducements might play in resolving the North Korea problem. It finds that while the “maximum pressure” narrative is plausible, the evidence to substantiate it is thin. Likewise, the North Korean regime is aware of the potentially constraining (or even destabilizing) political implications of cross-border economic integration and has acted to structure engagement in ways to blunt its transformative impact. Maximizing the transformative possibilities of engagement will require conscious planning by North Korea’s partners. Multilateral guidelines and voluntary codes on corporate conduct could be used to anchor this process, but they will only be effective if there is greater political commitment to such norms than has been witnessed to date. Without such commitments, engagement risks enabling North Korea’s doctrine of the parallel development of weapons of mass destruction and the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Noland, Marcus, 2018. "North Korea: Sanctions, Engagement, and Strategic Reorientation," MPRA Paper 89691, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:89691
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haggard, Stephan & Noland, Marcus, 2016. "Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea," MPRA Paper 105812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Noland , Marcus, 2014. "한반도 통일이 미국에 미칠 편익비용 분석 (A Study to Analyze Cost-Benefits of the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to the United States)," Policy Analyses 14-26, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.
    3. Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, 2012. "The Microeconomics of North--South Korean Cross-border Integration," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 407-430, September.
    4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, April.
    5. Cullen S. Hendrix & Marcus Noland, 2014. "Confronting the Curse: The Economics and Geopolitics of Natural Resource Governance," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 6765, April.
    6. Haggard, Stephan & Lee, Jennifer & Noland, Marcus, 2012. "Integration in the absence of institutions: China–North Korea cross-border exchange," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 130-145.
    7. Farole, Thomas, 2011. "Special Economic Zones: What Have We Learned?," World Bank - Economic Premise, The World Bank, issue 64, pages 1-5, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Noland, Marcus & Haggard, Stephan, 2023. "Economic Sanctions during Humanitarian Emergencies: The Case of North Korea," MPRA Paper 115920, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Evgeny V. Balatsky, 2024. "The multilevel management system for Russian economy amid sanctions," Journal of New Economy, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 6-26, July.
    3. Eungi Kim & Eun Sil Kim, 2020. "A critical examination of international research conducted by North Korean authors: Increasing trends of collaborative research between China and North Korea," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 124(1), pages 429-450, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    North Korea; sanctions; labor standards; voluntary codes; special economic zones;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • J47 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Coercive Labor Markets
    • J8 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards
    • P33 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - International Trade, Finance, Investment, Relations, and Aid

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