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Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining

Author

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  • Damiani, Mirella
  • Ricci, Andrea
Abstract
The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other. Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20

Suggested Citation

  • Damiani, Mirella & Ricci, Andrea, 2016. "Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining," MPRA Paper 72209, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:72209
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords: Training; Compensation; Management; Education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training

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