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Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?

Author

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  • Jurdziak, Leszek
Abstract
Is vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom? Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits from reduction of transactional costs described by Williamson. Additional benefits can be attained by application of open pit optimisation which leads to the solution of modified bilateral monopoly of lignite mine and power plant. Cooperation can assure joint profits maximisation and rivalry leads to suboptimal solution in Pareto sense. Due to asymmetry of information about the deposit the mine has information advantage and can apply its predominant solution maximising only their own profits in long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Jurdziak, Leszek, 2005. "Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?," MPRA Paper 534, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Mar 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:534
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/1/MPRA_paper_534.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blair, Roger D & Kaserman, David L, 1987. "A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 460-463, June.
    2. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-185, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of pr," MPRA Paper 2388, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
    2. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and pow," MPRA Paper 2384, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
    3. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Wpływ struktury organizacyjno-właścicielskiej na funkcjonowanie bilateralnego monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni," MPRA Paper 533, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Oct 2006.
    4. Jurdziak, Leszek & Woźniak (Wiktorowicz), Justyna, 2008. "Identyfikacja Czynników Ryzyka W Bilateralnym Monopolu Kopalni I Elektrowni [Identification Of Risk Factors In A Bilateral Monopoly Of A Mine And A Power Plant]," MPRA Paper 75181, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bilateral monopoly; lignite mine; power plant; market structure; trasactional costs; lignite price; price negotiation; strategic benefits; bargaining; cooperative game; Pareto optimality; asymmetry of information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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