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Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth approach

Author

Listed:
  • Beth Allen
  • Raymond Deneckere
  • Tom Faith
  • Dan Kovenock
Abstract
This paper considers the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent for a game in which the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price, possibly using mixed strategies. Depending on the magnitudes of the fixed set-up cost, the cost of capacity, and the relative costs of production, the model produces a wide spectrum of equilibrium behaviors, including some not previously suggested in the literature. Interesting deterrence effects occur because firms need time to build. In contrast to much previous work, the incumbent may hold idle capacity when entry is deterred.

Suggested Citation

  • Beth Allen & Raymond Deneckere & Tom Faith & Dan Kovenock, 1995. "Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth approach," Staff Report 187, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:187
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Capacity-Constrained Price Competition When Unit Costs Differ," Discussion Papers 861, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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