[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/44427.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

When risk-based regulation aims low: a strategic framework

Author

Listed:
  • Black, Julia
  • Baldwin, Robert
Abstract
This article develops a strategic framework for regulators to employ when choosing intervention strategies for dealing with low risks and reviewing performance, building on the analysis by the same authors in the previous edition of this journal. The framework occupies the operational “middle ground” between risk analysis and formal enforcement action. At its core is a matrix, the Good Regulatory Intervention Design (GRID), which provides a framework to categorize sites or activities on the basis of two factors: the nature of the risk and the nature of the regulatee. Using GRID, regulators can select which intervention tools to use, and determine the overall level of regulatory intensity that should apply. GRID is accompanied by the Good Regulatory Assessment Framework (GRAF) for agencies to use in reviewing their performance and provides a step-by-step process for enabling “double loop learning.” The article also argues that the process of developing such a framework highlighted the extent to which “low risk” and “high risk” regulation are distinct. “Low risk” means “low priority.” Justifying why certain risks should not receive much regulatory attention requires a particular type of engagement, and has a bearing on the regulatory strategies that are adopted

Suggested Citation

  • Black, Julia & Baldwin, Robert, 2012. "When risk-based regulation aims low: a strategic framework," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 44427, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:44427
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44427/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, 2012. "When risk‐based regulation aims low: Approaches and challenges," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 2-22, March.
    2. Scholz, John T., 1991. "Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 115-136, March.
    3. Black, Julia & Baldwin, Robert, 2010. "Really responsive risk-based regulation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27632, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul Almond & Mike Esbester, 2018. "Regulatory inspection and the changing legitimacy of health and safety," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 46-63, March.
    2. Juan Carlos Henao & Carmen Eloísa Ruiz López, 2018. "Corrupción en Colombia Tomo 3 Corrupción privada," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1026.
    3. Paul Sanderson & David Seidl & John Roberts, 2013. "The Limits of Flexible Regulation: Managers' Perceptions of Corporate Governance Codes and 'Comply-or-Explain'," Working Papers wp439, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Li Wang & David Demeritt & Henry Rothstein, 2023. "“Carrying the black pot”: Food safety and risk in China's reactive regulatory state," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 469-490, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jeroen van der Heijden, 2021. "Risk as an Approach to Regulatory Governance: An Evidence Synthesis and Research Agenda," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(3), pages 21582440211, July.
    2. Przemysław Brzuszczak, 2020. "Regulacja oparta na ryzyku jako refleksyjna strategia regulacyjna," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 139-151.
    3. Katalin Mérő, 2021. "The ascent and descent of banks’ risk-based capital regulation," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(4), pages 308-318, December.
    4. Charles Sabel & Gary Herrigel & Peer Hull Kristensen, 2018. "Regulation under uncertainty: The coevolution of industry and regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 371-394, September.
    5. Suurmond, Guido, 2007. "The effects of the enforcement strategy," MPRA Paper 21142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, 2012. "When risk‐based regulation aims low: Approaches and challenges," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 2-22, March.
    7. Kathryn Harrison, 1995. "Is cooperation the answer? Canadian environmental enforcement in comparative context," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 221-244.
    8. Miranda, Bruno Varella & de Oliveira, Gustavo Magalhães, 2023. "Assessing the performance of voluntary environmental agreements under high monitoring costs: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    9. Juan Carlos Henao & Carmen Eloísa Ruiz López, 2018. "Corrupción en Colombia Tomo 3 Corrupción privada," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1026.
    10. Zach Raff & Dietrich Earnhart, 2018. "Effect Of Cooperative Enforcement Strategies On Wastewater Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1357-1379, April.
    11. Olson, Mary K, 1999. "Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 573-601, October.
    12. Andreas Klinke & Ortwin Renn, 2021. "The Coming of Age of Risk Governance," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 544-557, March.
    13. Hood, Rick & Goldacre, Allie, 2021. "Exploring the impact of Ofsted inspections on performance in children’s social care," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    14. Peter J. May, 1993. "Mandate design and implementation: Enhancing implementation efforts and shaping regulatory styles," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 634-663.
    15. Eric Helland, 1998. "The Enforcement Of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, And Self-Reporting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 141-153, February.
    16. Ulbricht, Lena & von Grafenstein, Maximilian, 2016. "Editorial – Big data through the power lens: Marker for regulating innovation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 1-8.
    17. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Reinout A van der Veer & Markus Haverland, 2018. "Bread and butter or bread and circuses? Politicisation and the European Commission in the European Semester," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 524-545, September.
    19. Lucia Pellegrina & Giorgio Maio & Donato Masciandaro & Margherita Saraceno, 2023. "Are Bankers “Crying Wolf”? Type I, Type II Errors and Deterrence in Anti-Money Laundering: The Italian Case," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 9(2), pages 587-615, July.
    20. Sarah L. Stafford, 2011. "Do Environmental Audits Improve Long-term Compliance? Evidence from Manufacturing Facilities in Michigan," Working Papers 117, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    low risks; regulation; strategy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:44427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.