Learning, Matching and Aggregation

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Citations

Cited by:

1. Yannick Viossat, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(1), pages 91-113, April.
   • Yannick Viossat, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies," Post-Print hal-01253535, HAL.
2. Ed Hopkins, "undated". "Price Dispersion: An Evolutionary Approach," Discussion Papers 1996-3, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Ed Hopkins, "undated". "Price Dispersion: An Evolutionary Approach," Department of Economics 1996 : III, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, 1996. "Price Dispersion: An Evolutionary Approach," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, "undated". "Price Dispersion: an Evolutionary Approach," ELSE working papers 043, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
3. Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
   • Drew Fudenberg & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001695, David K. Levine.
   • Takahashi, Satoru & Fudenberg, Drew, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Scholarly Articles 27755310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
4. Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000226, www.najecon.org.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000226, David K. Levine.
5. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
   • Ed Hopkins, 1997. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 3, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
6. Benaïm, Michel & Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2009. "Learning in games with unstable equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1694-1709, July.
   • Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000609, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Ed Hopkins & Josef Hofbauer & Michel Benaim, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 135, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000547, UCLA Department of Economics.
7. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2006. "An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000683, David K. Levine.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning," Scholarly Articles 3200613, Harvard University Department of Economics.
8. Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, 2002. "The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1157-1190, November.
   • Ed Hopkins & Robert M Seymour, 2000. "The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 52, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Ed Hopkins & Roberty M. Seymour, 2002. "The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning," Game Theory and Information 0203002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
9. Josephson, Jens, 2008. "A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1569-1599, May.
   • Josephson, Jens, 2001. "A Numerical Analysis of the Evolutionary Stability of Learning Rules," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 474, Stockholm School of Economics.
10. Ted To, 1999. "Risk and evolution," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(2), pages 329-343.
    • Ted To, 1995. "Risk and Evolution," Microeconomics 9511003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
11. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
12. Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Adaptive Learning Models of Consumer Behaviour (first version)," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 80, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
13. Lahkar, Ratul & Seymour, Robert M., 2013. "Reinforcement learning in population games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 10-38.
14. Oyama, Daisuke, 2009. "Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and global stability," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 696-713, November.
    • Oyama, Daisuke, 2006. "Agglomeration under Forward-Looking Expectations: Potentials and Global Stability," MPRA Paper 15239, University Library of Munich, Germany.
15. Panayotis Mertikopoulos & William H. Sandholm, 2016. "Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 1297-1324, November.
16. Ramsza, Michal & Seymour, Robert M., 2010. "Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 303-324, January.
17. Takatoshi Tabuchi & Dao‐Zhi Zeng, 2004. "Stability of Spatial Equilibrium," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 641-660, November.
    • Takatoshi Tabuchi & Dao-Zhi Zeng, 2000. "Stability of Spatial Equilibrium," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-79, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
18. Fernando Lozano & Jaime Lozano & Mario García, 2007. "An artificial economy based on reinforcement learning and agent based modeling," Documentos de Trabajo 3907, Universidad del Rosario.

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More about this item

JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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