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Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?

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  • El-Shagi, Makram
  • Jung, Alexander
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chairman Greenspan influenced the Reserve Bank Presidents. This question is interesting, because it has been argued that their preferences would be more persistent compared to those of the Governors. We estimate individual Taylor-type reaction functions for the Federal Reserve Districts using their voiced interest rate preferences during the policy go-around as well as real-time economic information on the inflation and unemployment gap. A bootstrap analysis exploits information contained in these reaction functions and constructs counterfactual distributions of disagreement among the Federal Reserve Districts, assuming the absence of factors that could have enforced consensus. We compare these simulated distributions with the observed disagreement during the committee deliberations and find empirical evidence in favour of coordination. This detected coordination helped to bring the preferences of the Federal Reserve Districts more in line with Chairman Greenspan JEL Classification: C15, C53, D72, E58

Suggested Citation

  • El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2013. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Working Paper Series 1579, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20131579
    Note: 2106626
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    Cited by:

    1. Jung, Alexander, 2016. "Have minutes helped to predict fed funds rate changes?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 18-32.
    2. Bennani, Hamza & Farvaque, Etienne & Stanek, Piotr, 2018. "Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 416-424.
    3. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2014. "Dissent in monetary policy decisions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-154.
    4. Jung, Alexander & Latsos, Sophia, 2015. "Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 173-183.
    5. Baranowski, Pawel & Bennani, Hamza & Doryń, Wirginia, 2021. "Do the ECB's introductory statements help predict monetary policy? Evidence from a tone analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    6. Smales, Lee A. & Apergis, Nick, 2016. "The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making process," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 216-231.
    7. Hamza Bennani & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Exploring the informativeness and drivers of tone during committee meetings: the case of the Federal Reserve," Post-Print hal-04670309, HAL.
    8. Farvaque, Etienne & Malan, Franck & Stanek, Piotr, 2020. "Misplaced childhood: When recession children grow up as central bankers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    9. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
    10. A. Jung, 2013. "Policymakers’ Interest Rate Preferences: Recent Evidence for Three Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(3), pages 150-197, September.
    11. Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2016. "Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting," IWH Discussion Papers 15/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    12. Hamza Bennani, 2016. "Measuring Monetary Policy Stress for Fed District Representatives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(2), pages 156-176, May.
    13. Smales, L.A. & Apergis, N., 2017. "Understanding the impact of monetary policy announcements: The importance of language and surprises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 33-50.
    14. Mikael Apel & Marianna Blix Grimaldi & Isaiah Hull, 2022. "How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1459-1490, August.
    15. Bennani, Hamza & Romelli, Davide, 2024. "Exploring the informativeness and drivers of tone during committee meetings: The case of the Federal Reserve," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    16. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Jung, Alexander, 2016. "Have FOMC minutes helped markets to predict FED funds rate changes?," Working Paper Series 1961, European Central Bank.
    18. Hüpper, Florian & Kempa, Bernd, 2023. "Inflation targeting and inflation communication of the Federal Reserve: Words and deeds," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bootstrap.; Federal Reserve Districts; Greenspan era; individual reaction functions; real-time data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
    • C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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