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Auditing claims in insurance market with fraud : the credibility issue

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  • Picard, Pierre
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  • Picard, Pierre, 1994. "Auditing claims in insurance market with fraud : the credibility issue," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9420, CEPREMAP.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9420
    as

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    File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9420.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
    2. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    3. Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-244, May.
    4. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee, 1989. "Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 139-163, Summer.
    5. Kim C. Border & Joel Sobel, 1987. "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 525-540.
    6. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    7. Mathias Dewatripont, 1988. "Commitment Through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(3), pages 377-390.
    8. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
    9. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    10. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
    11. Picard, Pierre, 2000. "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1049-1071, November.
    12. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Vanasse, C., 1989. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Auditing And Workers' Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 8941, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    13. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, B & Picard, P, 1995. "Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 621-646, May.
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