[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cir/cirwor/2003s-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada

Author

Listed:
  • M. Martin Boyer
  • Jörg Schiller
Abstract
The recent automobile liability insurance crisis in Atlantic Canada has prompted the four provincial legislations (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island) to setup a task force to redesign, if necessary, the personal automobile insurance system. After reviewing some of the most interesting new regulatory changes, our paper proposes a new area of discussion: The merger of the four provincial insurance regulatory bodies to combat insurance fraud. We base our paper on the principle that recent premium increases are mainly due to an increase in insurance fraud. We show that merging the regulatory bodies may reduce insurance fraud if the merger allows savings on the average audit cost and on the development of better fraud detection technology. Finally, we suggest a fraud reducing insurance taxation scheme to finance insurance fraud investigations. La récente crise dans le Canada Atlantique au sujet de l'assurance de la responsabilité civile des automobilistes a contraint les gouvernements des quatre provinces (Terre-Neuve et Labrador, Nouveau-Brunswick, Nouvelle-Écosse et l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard) à mettre en place une commission pour étudier la possibilité de réorganiser, si nécessaire, leur système d'assurance automobile. Après avoir analysé les plus intéressantes modifications à la réglementation mises en place dans ces provinces, notre étude offre un nouveau terrain de discussion, soit la fusion des quatre réglementations provinciales afin de combattre la fraude à l'assurance. Notre étude se base sur le principe que les récentes augmentations dans les primes sont attribuables à une augmentation de la fraude à l'assurance dans ces provinces. En fusionnant les réglementations des quatre provinces, nous montrons que la fraude à l'assurance peut diminuer si la fusion permet d'épargner une partie du coût de vérification encouru par les assureurs lors de réclamations douteuses. Également, nous montrons qu'une telle fusion peut permettre de développer une meilleure technologie de vérification des réclamations. Nous terminons le papier en suggérant un système de taxation particulier qui non seulement peut financer les investissements nécessaires pour combattre la fraude, mais peut également réduire la fraude directement.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Martin Boyer & Jörg Schiller, 2003. "Merging Automobile Insurance Regulatory Bodies: The Case of Atlantic Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-70, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-70
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2003s-70.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lacker, Jeffrey M & Weinberg, John A, 1989. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1345-1363, December.
    2. Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    5. Nahum Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 257-289, June.
    6. Frech, H E, III & Ginsburg, Paul B, 1975. "Imposed Health Insurance in Monopolistic Markets: A Theoretical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(1), pages 55-70, March.
    7. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
    8. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
    9. Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-244, May.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6456 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Alger, Ingela & Albert Ma, Ching-to, 2003. "Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-247, February.
    12. Feldstein, Martin S, 1970. "The Rising Price of Physicians' Services," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 52(2), pages 121-133, May.
    13. Jörg Schiller, 2006. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(3), pages 421-438, September.
    14. Fang, Hanming & Moscarini, Giuseppe, 2005. "Morale hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 749-777, May.
    15. Nell, Martin & Richter, Andreas & Schiller, Jörg, 2009. "When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 343-354, April.
    16. Borenstein, Severin, 1989. "The economics of costly risk sorting in competitive insurance markets," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 25-39, June.
    17. Smith, Eric & Wright, Randall, 1992. "Why Is Automobile Insurance in Philadelphia So Damn Expensive?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 756-772, September.
    18. Artis, Manuel & Ayuso, Mercedes & Guillen, Montserrat, 1999. "Modelling different types of automobile insurance fraud behaviour in the Spanish market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 67-81, March.
    19. G. Dionne & F. Giuliano & P. Picard, 2002. "Optimal auditing for insurance fraud," THEMA Working Papers 2002-32, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    20. Winter Ralph A., 1994. "The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 379-415, September.
    21. Anne Gron, 1994. "Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 110-127, Spring.
    22. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1982. "Kinked utility and the demand for human wealth and liability insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 149-162.
    23. Crocker, Keith J & Tennyson, Sharon, 2002. "Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 469-507, October.
    24. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    25. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82.
    26. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    27. Cummins, J. David & Danzon, Patricia M., 1997. "Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance Markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 3-38, January.
    28. Winter, Ralph A, 1991. "Solvency Regulation and the Property-Liability "Insurance Cycle."," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(3), pages 458-471, July.
    29. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-280, Part I, M.
    30. Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, 1998. "Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 355-375, April.
    31. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
    32. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Schiller, Jörg, 2004. "Versicherungsbetrug als ökonomisches Problem: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 13, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boyer, M. Martin & Schiller, Jörg, 2003. "Merging automobile regulatory bodies: The case of Atlantic Canada," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 11, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    2. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    4. Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    6. M. Martin Boyer, 2000. "Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(2), pages 159-178, December.
    7. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
    8. Georges Dionne & Robert Gagné, 2001. "Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence From Automobile Insurance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(2), pages 290-301, May.
    9. Katja Müller & Hato Schmeiser & Joël Wagner, 2016. "The impact of auditing strategies on insurers’ profitability," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 46-79, January.
    10. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 559-582, December.
    11. Schiller, Jörg, 2004. "Versicherungsbetrug als ökonomisches Problem: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 13, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6456 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    14. Hau, Arthur, 2008. "Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1680-1700, May.
    15. Jing Ai & Patrick L. Brockett & Linda L. Golden & Montserrat Guillén, 2013. "A Robust Unsupervised Method for Fraud Rate Estimation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 80(1), pages 121-143, March.
    16. P. Picard, 1998. "Insurance fraud : theory," THEMA Working Papers 98-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    17. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO.
    18. M. Martin Boyer & Richard Peter, 2020. "Insurance Fraud in a Rothschild–Stiglitz World," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(1), pages 117-142, March.
    19. Richard Watt, 2003. "Curtailing Ex-Post Fraud in Risk Sharing Arrangements," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 247-263, September.
    20. Farbmacher, Helmut & Löw, Leander & Spindler, Martin, 2022. "An explainable attention network for fraud detection in claims management," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 228(2), pages 244-258.
    21. Domenico SCALERA & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2004. "From regulation to free market: the experience of the European motor insurance market," Working Papers 205, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    insurance fraud; asymmetric information; insurance taxation; public policy; fraude à l'assurance; information asymétrique; taxation à l'assurance; politique publique;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciranca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.