[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/1740.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the viability of energy communities

Author

Listed:
  • Abada, I.
  • Ehrenmann, A.
  • Lambin, X.
Abstract
Following the development of decentralized production technologies, energy communities have become a topic of increased interest. While the potential benefits have been described, we use the framework of cooperative game theory to test the ability of such communities to adequately share the gains. Indeed, despite the potential value created by such coalitions, there is no guarantee that they will be viable: a subset of participants may find it profitable to exit the community and create another one of their own. We take the case of a neighborhood, having access to a limited resource e.g. a shared roof or piece of land which they can exploit if they invest in some renewable production capacity. By joining the community, participants also enjoy aggregation gains in the form of reduced network fees. We find conditions depending on the structure of renewable installation costs, on the magnitude of the aggregation effect and coordination costs and, most importantly, on the chosen sharing rule, under which the whole energy community is stable. Efficiency could require the intervention of a social planner or a change in network tariff structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Abada, I. & Ehrenmann, A. & Lambin, X., 2017. "On the viability of energy communities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1740, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1740
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1740.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hervé Moulin & Scott Shenker, 2001. "Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(3), pages 511-533.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357, Elsevier.
    3. Lopes, Rui Amaral & Martins, João & Aelenei, Daniel & Lima, Celson Pantoja, 2016. "A cooperative net zero energy community to improve load matching," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 1-13.
    4. Lo Prete, Chiara & Hobbs, Benjamin F., 2016. "A cooperative game theoretic analysis of incentives for microgrids in regulated electricity markets," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 524-541.
    5. Hoppmann, Joern & Volland, Jonas & Schmidt, Tobias S. & Hoffmann, Volker H., 2014. "The economic viability of battery storage for residential solar photovoltaic systems – A review and a simulation model," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 1101-1118.
    6. Massol, Olivier & Tchung-Ming, Stéphane, 2010. "Cooperation among liquefied natural gas suppliers: Is rationalization the sole objective?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 933-947, July.
    7. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Pierru, Axel, 2007. "Allocating the CO2 emissions of an oil refinery with Aumann-Shapley prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 563-577, May.
    9. Basak, Prasenjit & Chowdhury, S. & Halder nee Dey, S. & Chowdhury, S.P., 2012. "A literature review on integration of distributed energy resources in the perspective of control, protection and stability of microgrid," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 16(8), pages 5545-5556.
    10. Comodi, Gabriele & Giantomassi, Andrea & Severini, Marco & Squartini, Stefano & Ferracuti, Francesco & Fonti, Alessandro & Nardi Cesarini, Davide & Morodo, Matteo & Polonara, Fabio, 2015. "Multi-apartment residential microgrid with electrical and thermal storage devices: Experimental analysis and simulation of energy management strategies," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 854-866.
    11. Hagspiel, Simeon, 2016. "Supply Chain Reliability and the Role of Individual Suppliers," EWI Working Papers 2016-5, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    12. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    13. Kellner, Florian, 2016. "Allocating greenhouse gas emissions to shipments in road freight transportation: Suggestions for a global carbon accounting standard," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 565-575.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sirviö, Katja & Motta, Sergio & Rauma, Kalle & Evens, Corentin, 2024. "Multi-level functional analysis of developing prosumers and energy communities with value creation framework," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 368(C).
    2. Cortade, Thomas & Poudou, Jean-Christophe, 2022. "Peer-to-peer energy platforms: Incentives for prosuming," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    3. Almendra Awerkin & Paolo Falbo & Tiziano Vargiolu, 2023. "Optimal Investment and Fair Sharing Rules of the Incentives for Renewable Energy Communities," Papers 2311.12055, arXiv.org.
    4. Tim Schittekatte & Valerie Reif & Leonardo Meeus, 2021. "Welcoming New Entrants into European Electricity Markets," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(13), pages 1-20, July.
    5. Steffen Limmer, 2023. "Empirical Study of Stability and Fairness of Schemes for Benefit Distribution in Local Energy Communities," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(4), pages 1-16, February.
    6. Abada, I. & Ehrenmann, A. & Lambin, X., 2018. "Unintended consequences: The snowball effect of energy communities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1828, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Abada, Ibrahim & Ehrenmann, Andreas & Lambin, Xavier, 2020. "Unintended consequences: The snowball effect of energy communities," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    8. Fuentes González, Fabián & van der Weijde, Adriaan Hendrik & Sauma, Enzo, 2020. "The promotion of community energy projects in Chile and Scotland: An economic approach using biform games," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    9. Saveria Olga Murielle Boulanger & Martina Massari & Danila Longo & Beatrice Turillazzi & Carlo Alberto Nucci, 2021. "Designing Collaborative Energy Communities: A European Overview," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-17, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ibrahim Abada, Andreas Ehrenmann, and Xavier Lambin, 2020. "On the Viability of Energy Communities," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    2. Ibrahim Abada & Andreas Ehrenmann & Xavier Lambin, 2018. "Unintended consequences: The snowball effect of energy communities," Working Papers EPRG 1812, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    3. Abada, Ibrahim & Ehrenmann, Andreas & Lambin, Xavier, 2020. "Unintended consequences: The snowball effect of energy communities," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    4. Peter Knudsen & Lars Østerdal, 2012. "Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 763-774, November.
    5. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 173-193, March.
    6. Hervé Moulin & Yves Sprumont, 2007. "Fair allocation of production externalities : recent results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(1), pages 7-36.
    7. Gao, Evelyn & Sowlati, Taraneh & Akhtari, Shaghaygh, 2019. "Profit allocation in collaborative bioenergy and biofuel supply chains," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    8. Fridgen, Gilbert & Kahlen, Micha & Ketter, Wolfgang & Rieger, Alexander & Thimmel, Markus, 2018. "One rate does not fit all: An empirical analysis of electricity tariffs for residential microgrids," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 800-814.
    9. Ibrahim Abada & Andreas Ehrenmann & Xavier Lambin, 2020. "On the Viability of Energy Communities," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(1), pages 113-150, January.
    10. Michel Le Breton & Juan Moreno-Ternero & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber, 2013. "Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 673-694, August.
    11. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & Jordi Teixidó-Figueras & Cori Vilella, 2016. "The global carbon budget: a conflicting claims problem," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 693-703, June.
    12. Àlex Alonso & Jordi de la Hoz & Helena Martín & Sergio Coronas & José Matas, 2021. "Individual vs. Community: Economic Assessment of Energy Management Systems under Different Regulatory Frameworks," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-27, January.
    13. Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2015. "Non-manipulable rules for land rental problems," MPRA Paper 67334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. de la Hoz, Jordi & Martín, Helena & Alonso, Alex & Carolina Luna, Adriana & Matas, José & Vasquez, Juan C. & Guerrero, Josep M., 2019. "Regulatory-framework-embedded energy management system for microgrids: The case study of the Spanish self-consumption scheme," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 251(C), pages 1-1.
    15. Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan & Jason R. Marden & Adam Wierman, 2014. "Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 1252-1296, November.
    16. Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2013. "Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 359-403, October.
    17. Jens Leth Hougaard & Hervé Moulin, 2018. "Sharing the cost of risky projects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 663-679, May.
    18. Louis de Mesnard, 2015. "The three wives problem and Shapley value," Post-Print hal-01091714, HAL.
    19. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Chiu Yu Ko, 2020. "Sharing sequentially triggered losses," IFRO Working Paper 2020/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    20. Harless, Patrick, 2017. "Wary of the worst: Maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 316-328.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Energy communities; Cooperative game theory; Decentralized power production; Consumer participation; Micro-grids;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1740. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jake Dyer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.