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The Design of Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the New York City Bonus Program

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  • Sarena F. Goodman
  • Lesley J. Turner
Abstract
Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise student achievement and stimulate system-wide innovation. We examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to free ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results underscore the importance of carefully considering the design of teacher incentive pay programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Sarena F. Goodman & Lesley J. Turner, 2013. "The Design of Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the New York City Bonus Program," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 409-420.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/668676
    DOI: 10.1086/668676
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    Cited by:

    1. Liebowitz, David D., 2021. "Teacher evaluation for accountability and growth: Should policy treat them as complements or substitutes?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    2. Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Bonus pools and the informativeness principle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 180-191.
    3. Adam M. Lavecchia & Philip Oreopoulos & Robert S. Brown, 2020. "Long-Run Effects from Comprehensive Student Support: Evidence from Pathways to Education," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 209-224, June.
    4. Timothy Bond & Kevin Mumford, 2017. "Teacher Performance Pay in the United States: Incidence and Adult Outcomes," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1289, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    5. Barrera-Osorio, Felipe & Raju, Dhushyanth, 2017. "Teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence from Pakistan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 75-91.
    6. Andrea Lepine, 2016. "Teacher Incentives and Student Performance: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2016_18, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    7. Alexis Le Chapelain, 2014. "Market for education and student achievement [Marché de l’éducation et réussite scolaire]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03510563, HAL.
    8. Dora Gicheva, 2022. "Altruism and Burnout: Long Hours in the Teaching Profession," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 75(2), pages 427-457, March.
    9. Pope, Nolan G., 2019. "The effect of teacher ratings on teacher performance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 84-110.
    10. Dahal,Mahesh & Nguyen,Quynh T., 2014. "Private non-state sector engagement in the provision of educational services at the primary and secondary levels in South Asia : an analytical review of its role in school enrollment and student achie," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6899, The World Bank.
    11. Maria Cotofan, 2019. "Learning from Praise: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Teachers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-082/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Hugh Macartney & Robert McMillan & Uros Petronijevic, 2018. "Teacher Value-Added and Economic Agency," NBER Working Papers 24747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Josse (J.) Delfgaauw & Robert (A.J.) Dur & Michiel Souverijn, 2017. "Team Incentives, Task Assignment, and Performance: A Field Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-090/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Alexis Le Chapelain, 2014. "Market for education and student achievement [Marché de l’éducation et réussite scolaire]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03510563, HAL.
    15. Gershenson, Seth, 2021. "Identifying and Producing Effective Teachers," IZA Discussion Papers 14096, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Baethge, Caroline & Fiedler, Marina, 2016. "Aligning mission preferences: Does self-selection foster performance in working groups?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe B-18-16, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    17. Brehm, Margaret & Imberman, Scott A. & Lovenheim, Michael F., 2017. "Achievement effects of individual performance incentives in a teacher merit pay tournament," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 133-150.
    18. Busso, Matías & Alfonso, Mariana & Ñopo, Hugo R. & Rivera Bianchi, Antonella Maria & Yentzen, Triana, 2024. "Becoming a Teacher: Experimental Evidence from an Information Intervention," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 13821, Inter-American Development Bank.
    19. Scott A. Imberman, 2015. "How effective are financial incentives for teachers?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 158-158, June.
    20. Martorell, Paco & Miller, Trey & Santibañez, Lucrecia & Augustine, Catherine H., 2016. "Can incentives for parents and students change educational inputs? Experimental evidence from summer school," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 113-126.
    21. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1jgbspo1909q48svne93o55rca is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Berlinski, Samuel & Ramos, Alejandra, 2020. "Teacher mobility and merit pay: Evidence from a voluntary public award program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    23. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1jgbspo1909q48svne93o55rca is not listed on IDEAS

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