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Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

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  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Rutgers University)

  • , P.

    (Department of Economics, Rutgers University)

Abstract
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • , & , P., 2014. "Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1178
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Campbell, Michael J. & Smith, Vernon L., 2021. "An elementary humanomics approach to boundedly rational quadratic models," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 562(C).
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    7. Campbell, Michael, 2020. "Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets—Long-term investor dynamics and phases," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 540(C).
    8. Campbell, Michael J., 2022. "Heavy-tailed distributions of volume and price-change resulting from strategy coordination and decision noise," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 607(C).
    9. Wei He, 2022. "Discontinuous stochastic games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 827-858, June.
    10. Sun, Xiang & Zeng, Yishu, 2020. "Perfect and proper equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 288-308.
    11. Argyrios Deligkas & Eduard Eiben & Gregory Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2023. "Some coordination problems are harder than others," Papers 2311.03195, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Discontinuous game; potential game; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; stable set; essential equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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