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Self-Censorship in Public Discourse

Author

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  • GLENN C. LOURY

    (Boston University)

Abstract
Uncertainty about what motivates “senders†of public messages leads “receivers†to “read between the lines†to discern the sender's deepest commitments. Anticipating this, senders “write between the lines,†editing their expressions so as to further their own ends. I examine how this interactive process of inference and deceit affects the quality and extent of public deliberations on sensitive issues. A principle conclusion is that genuine moral discourse on difficult social issues can become impossible when the risks of upsetting some portion of one's audience are too great. Reliance on euphemism and platitude should be expected in this strategic climate. Groups may embark on a tragic course of action, believed by many at the outset to be ill-conceived, but that has become impossible to criticize.

Suggested Citation

  • Glenn C. Loury, 1994. "Self-Censorship in Public Discourse," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(4), pages 428-461, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:6:y:1994:i:4:p:428-461
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463194006004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gomez-Ruano, Gerardo, 2012. "Discrimination and Freedom of Speech: Is there a Benefit from Political Correctness?," MPRA Paper 93885, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2013. "Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 369-397.
    3. Smaldino, Paul E. & Turner, Matthew Adam, 2020. "Covert signaling is an adaptive communication strategy in diverse populations," SocArXiv j9wyn, Center for Open Science.
    4. Patricia Funk, 2016. "How Accurate Are Surveyed Preferences for Public Policies? Evidence from a Unique Institutional Setup," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 442-454, July.
    5. Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, 2005. "Words That Kill? An Economic Model of the Influence of Speech on Behavior (with Particular Reference to Hate Speech)," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 93-136, January.
    6. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "A psychological game with interdependent preference types," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000511, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, 2003. "Words that Kill? Economic Perspectives on Hate Speech and Hate Crimes," Working papers 2003-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    8. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
    9. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
    10. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2006. "Intentions, Insincerity, and Prosocial Behavior," MPRA Paper 3223, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 13 May 2007.
    11. Mike Reay, 1995. "In What Way Could Political Correctness be Beneficial?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 493-497, October.
    12. S. Nageeb Ali & Roland Bénabou, 2020. "Image versus Information: Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 116-164, August.
    13. Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December.
    14. Bradford Cornell, 1995. "A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(1), pages 4-30, January.
    15. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "A Psychological Game with Interdependent Preference Types," CESifo Working Paper Series 1824, CESifo.
    16. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2018. "Receiver’s dilemma," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 116-124.
    17. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "Intentions, Insincerity, and Prosocial Behavior," Working Papers 0703, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    18. Deivis Angeli & Matt Lowe & The Village Team & Matthew Lowe, 2023. "Virtue Signals," CESifo Working Paper Series 10475, CESifo.
    19. Klement, Alon & Neeman, Zvika, 2012. "Does Information about Arbitrators’Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275786, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    20. Arnaud Wolff, 2022. "The Signaling Value of Social Identity," Working Papers of BETA 2022-15, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    21. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "Intentions and Social Interactions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1757, CESifo.
    22. Patricia Funk, 2012. "How accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies? Evidence from a unique institutional setup," Economics Working Papers 1334, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2013.

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