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Lobbies Competition and Bilateral International Environmental Agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Geum Soo Kim

    (Hoseo University)

Abstract
This paper analyzes two small open economies that share a natural environment and consider an environmental agreement between them. The two governments do not merely maximize general welfare in their respective countries, but also pick a policy partially in response to their internal “functionally specialized†industrial and environmental lobbies. This paper provides the conditions under which an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) between those two countries could be achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium with or without special interests’ pressures.

Suggested Citation

  • Geum Soo Kim, 2013. "Lobbies Competition and Bilateral International Environmental Agreements," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 81-96.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20130630-29-1-04
    as

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    File URL: http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-20130630-29-1-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2013. "Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 219-234.
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    8. Conconi, Paola, 2003. "Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 399-422, March.
    9. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    10. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
    11. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Achim Hagen & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2021. "National political pressure groups and the stability of international environmental agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 405-425, September.
    2. Achim Hagen & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2016. "The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers V-391-16, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2016.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy; IEA; Lobby; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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