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Redealing the cards: How an eco-industry modifies the political economy of environmental taxes

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  • Canton, Joan
Abstract
This article presents a combined economic-political model of environmental taxation setting. The model introduces a third lobby group - the lobby of an eco-industry - in addition to the traditional lobbies of polluting firms and environmentalists. Pressure groups interact to influence the environmental tax chosen by a regulator maximizing its chances of being reelected. The eco-industry lobby adds a new political contribution toward a higher environmental tax. The imperfectly competitive structure of the eco-industry also modifies the incentives of the usual lobbies. When the foreign environmental policy is constant, environmentalists can be in favor of a decrease in the local tax in order to reduce foreign pollution. We also discuss the formation of alliances between the eco-industry and one of the other lobbies and their potential impact. In general, the impact of lobbying activities on the politically optimal tax is ambiguous and depends on the relative concentration of each pressure group.

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  • Canton, Joan, 2008. "Redealing the cards: How an eco-industry modifies the political economy of environmental taxes," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 295-315, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:295-315
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernard, Sophie, 2011. "Remanufacturing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 337-351.
    2. Damien Sans & Sonia Schwartz & Hubert Stahn, 2015. "On Abatement Services: Market Power and Efficient Environmental Regulation," Working Papers halshs-01182200, HAL.
    3. Nicolli, Francesco & Vona, Francesco, 2019. "Energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in OECD countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 853-867.
    4. Menegaki, Angeliki N. & Ozturk, Ilhan, 2013. "Growth and energy nexus in Europe revisited: Evidence from a fixed effects political economy model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 881-887.
    5. Roberta Sestini & Donatella Pugliese, 2021. "To buy or to do it yourself? Pollution policy and environmental goods in developing countries," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 48(1), pages 105-135, March.
    6. Damien Sans, 2015. "Optimal Taxation Rule Reversal in the Presence of Gentle Polluters and Greedy Cleaners," Working Papers halshs-01247190, HAL.
    7. Solveig Delabroye, 2014. "The Eco-Industry and Trade Agreements," CIRANO Working Papers 2014s-45, CIRANO.
    8. Joan Canton, 2009. "Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies policies," Working Papers 2009.76, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Sonia Schwartz & Hubert Stahn, 2014. "Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfectly Competitive Eco-Industries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(1), pages 69-95, February.
    10. Masakazu Maezuru, 2012. "International Environmental Policies and Environmental Lobbying in the Presence of Eco-industry," ERSA conference papers ersa12p700, European Regional Science Association.
    11. Damien Sans & Sonia Schwartz & Hubert Stahn, 2014. "About Polluting Eco-Industries: Optimal Provision of Abatement Goods and Pigouvian Fees," Working Papers halshs-01083464, HAL.
    12. Francesco Vona & Francesco Nicolli, 2013. "Energy market liberalisation and renewable energy policies in oecd countries," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2013-10, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    13. Keisuke Kawata & Yasunori Ouchida, 2013. "Offshoring, trade and environmental policies: Effects of transboundary pollution," IDEC DP2 Series 3-8, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
    14. Miyamoto, Takuro, 2014. "Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 141-167.

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