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Communication under language barriers

Author

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  • Giovannoni, Francesco
  • Xiong, Siyang
Abstract
We study the welfare effect of language barriers in communication. Specifically, we compare the equilibrium welfare in a game with language barriers to that in the equivalent game without language barriers. We show how and why language barriers may (weakly) improve welfare by providing two positive results. First, in a game with any language barriers, we prove that if we allow for N-dimensional communication, any equilibrium outcome of the equivalent game without language barriers can be replicated. Second, for any payoff primitive, we provide a welfare ranking for several noisy-communication devices, including language barriers, that generalizes the results in Goltsman et al. (2009). In particular, our results imply that there always exist some language barriers whose maximal equilibrium welfare (always weakly and sometimes strictly) dominates any noisy-talk equilibrium (and hence also any cheap-talk equilibrium) under no language barriers.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovannoni, Francesco & Xiong, Siyang, 2019. "Communication under language barriers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 274-303.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:274-303
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    14. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1993009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," Working Papers hal-03393108, HAL.
    2. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020. "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 105-121.
    3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2022. "The measurement of the value of a language," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    4. Gesche, Tobias, 2021. "De-biasing strategic communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 452-464.
    5. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication," TSE Working Papers 18-939, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019. "Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
    10. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T. & Riener, Gerhard, 2022. "Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 360-378.
    11. Hideshi Itoh, 2023. "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 333-354, July.
    12. Gustavo Bergantiños & Christian Trudeau, 2024. "Monotonicity and the value of a language," Working Papers 2403, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    13. Alla Sulyma, 2022. "Klasyfikacja barier komunikacyjnych z pokoleniem Z w miejscu pracy," Nowoczesne Systemy Zarządzania. Modern Management Systems, Military University of Technology, Faculty of Security, Logistics and Management, Institute of Organization and Management, issue 2, pages 13-28.
    14. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/3b2230a4419v9ojcpu27tsdrtb is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Jérôme Mathis & Marcello Puca & Simone M. Sepe, 2021. "Deliberative Institutions and Optimality," CSEF Working Papers 614, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jun 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap talk; Language barriers; Mediation; Noisy talk; Communication; Information transmission;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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